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Cover of the Journal of the Kansas Trial Lawyers Association, May 2026 issue

One Strike and You’re Out! A Plaintiff’s Guide to Kansas’s Public Speech Protection Act and a Decade of Developing Case Law

May 2026 May 1, 2026

By N. Russell Hazlewood

Originally published in the Journal of the Kansas Trial Lawyers Association, Vol. 49 (May 2026). This article reflects the law as of that date.

I. Introduction

In 2016, the Kansas Legislature enacted the Public Speech Protection Act, K.S.A. 60-5320 (KPSPA), joining what has grown to be 40 states that have adopted some form of anti-SLAPP legislation.[1] The statute’s stated purpose is “to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of a person to petition, and speak freely and associate freely, in connection with a public issue or issue of public interest to the maximum extent permitted by law while, at the same time, protecting the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.”[2] The Legislature further directed that the Act’s provisions “shall be applied and construed liberally to effectuate its general purposes.”[3]

For plaintiff’s lawyers, the Act is not merely an academic curiosity. A motion to strike under the KPSPA, if granted, results in the targeted claims being stricken (and the action dismissed if no other claims remain), mandatory attorney fee-shifting, and potential sanctions against the plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel. Fee awards in Kansas appellate decisions have ranged from several thousand dollars to over $34,000, with appellate courts awarding additional fees on appeal.[4] Understanding the statute’s reach, and the growing body of Kansas appellate authority construing it ever more broadly, is essential for any practitioner whose clients bring claims that arguably touch on speech, petitioning, or associational activity.

One threshold point requires emphasis because it is widely misunderstood: the KPSPA’s protections are not coextensive with the First Amendment. The Act expressly defines protected activity to include categories of communication, such as communications “in or pertaining to” judicial proceedings, official proceedings, or governmental proceedings, that are protected by the statute’s own terms regardless of whether they would independently qualify for First Amendment protection.[5] After Williams v. Greenstein, the Court of Appeals confirmed that the petition prong’s judicial proceeding category contains no public interest requirement at all, because the statutory definition of communications ‘in or pertaining to’ judicial proceedings in K.S.A. 60-5320(c)(5)(A)(i) contains no public-interest requirement.[6] The result is that the KPSPA reaches a significant category of communications in or pertaining to judicial and other governmental proceedings that would not be covered by the First Amendment alone.

As construed by recent Kansas cases, the KPSPA now operates less like a traditional anti-SLAPP statute tied to First Amendment doctrine and more like a hybrid device: it broadly protects communications in or pertaining to judicial and other governmental proceedings under the petition prong, while simultaneously imposing an early evidentiary screen that requires plaintiffs to come forward with proof before discovery begins.

This article surveys the statutory framework, traces the progression of Kansas case law from the first appellate decision in 2017 through 2025, addresses the statute’s applicability in federal court, including limitations on its application to federal claims and the unsettled treatment of the discovery stay, and offers practical observations for plaintiff’s attorneys facing (or, better yet, anticipating) a motion to strike.

II. The Statutory Framework: A Two-Step Analysis

The heart of the KPSPA is found in subsection (d), which establishes a two-step burden-shifting procedure.[7]

Step One: Does the Claim Concern Protected Activity?

At step one, the party moving to strike bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that the claim “is based on, relates to or is in response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition or right of association.”[8] The movant need not prove that it actually engaged in the speech at issue; the movant’s denial of making the statements is irrelevant at this stage.[9] The inquiry focuses on the content and context of the communications underlying the plaintiff’s claims, not merely how the plaintiff has drafted the petition. As the Court of Appeals recognized in Neuman v. Anesthesia Associates of Kansas City, a court must examine the actual communicative conduct at issue to prevent a savvy plaintiff from avoiding the Act through creative pleading.[10] This is a low threshold, but it is not a foregone conclusion. Defendants do fail, particularly under the free speech prong, when they cannot connect the challenged communication to a public issue or identify which statutory category applies.[11] After Williams, however, the step-one hurdle is substantially lower for claims arising from litigation conduct, because communications in or pertaining to a judicial proceeding require no independent showing of public interest. For that category of claims, step two will usually be the more consequential question.

Step Two: Can the Plaintiff Show a Likelihood of Prevailing?

If the movant satisfies step one, the burden shifts to the responding party to “establish a likelihood of prevailing on the claim by presenting substantial competent evidence to support a prima facie case.”[12] “Substantial competent evidence refers to legal and relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as being adequate to support a conclusion.”[13] Doe v. Kansas State University observed that the process under subsection (d) “is analogous to a summary judgment procedure in that the district court is required to review pleadings and affidavits to determine whether a claim is allowed to proceed as a matter of law.”[14] But unlike a motion to dismiss, the court is “not required to accept the facts asserted in the plaintiff’s petition as true”;[15] instead, the plaintiff must present substantial competent evidence to support a prima facie case.[16]

The operative word in the statute is “by:” it defines the manner of the required showing. The court does not weigh competing evidence or predict the plaintiff’s ultimate prospects at trial; if the plaintiff makes the required showing, the case proceeds. The statute further provides that the court’s step-two determination may not be admitted later in the case and does not affect the burden or standard of proof at trial.[17]

Doe established several principles that define the step-two inquiry. First, “mere allegations in an unverified complaint” are insufficient to avoid an order to strike.[18] Second, notice-pleading standards do not apply: the fact that allegations survived a motion to dismiss does not mean they satisfy the statute’s evidentiary requirement, because “substantiation requires something more.”[19] Third, allegations made upon information and belief are insufficient where the plaintiff “provides no facts to support this generic claim.”[20] In short, a plaintiff cannot rely on the petition itself to meet the step-two burden.

When this evidentiary standard is paired with the discovery stay under subsection (e),[21] the practical consequence is significant: a plaintiff who lacks pre-suit evidence faces an uphill battle. Doe underscores why this structure matters: even where the KPSPA applies, claims lacking evidentiary support will be eliminated at an early stage. The discovery stay limits the plaintiff’s ability to use the litigation itself to develop that evidence, while the step-two standard requires it at the outset. The statute provides a safety valve: upon a showing of good cause, the court may allow “specified and limited discovery relevant to the motion.”[22] But a plaintiff who files on nothing more than a hunch faces a serious risk that the case will end at the motion to strike, with a mandatory fee award.

Despite this burden, the cases provide some guidance on what constitutes sufficient evidence at step two. For defamation and similar claims, a plaintiff must come forward with evidence supporting the essential elements of the claim – specific false statements, concrete damages, and facts supporting fault—rather than generalized allegations or conclusory assertions. Where responding parties have met their burden, they have done so with documentary evidence and sworn materials. In Shepard, for example, the Commission satisfied step two by presenting evidence of its statutory authority and the factual basis for its subpoenas, demonstrating that the inquiry is ultimately an evidentiary one, not a pleading exercise.

This two-step structure reflects the statute’s dual function: while step one broadly protects certain categories of communication, step two operates as an early evidentiary filter requiring plaintiffs to substantiate their claims before discovery proceeds.

III. Types of Claims Impacted

The statute protects three categories of activity. The “exercise of the right of free speech” means a communication made in connection with a public issue or issue of public interest, defined to include issues related to health or safety, environmental, economic or community well-being, the government, a public official or public figure, or a good, product or service in the marketplace.[23] The “exercise of the right to petition” encompasses over a dozen categories of communications, including communications in or pertaining to judicial, official, executive, and legislative proceedings.[24] The “exercise of the right of association” covers communications between individuals who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests.[25] The appellate decisions to date have not turned on the association prong, leaving its practical reach undeveloped.

The Kansas appellate decisions to date have applied the statute to claims for defamation, tortious interference, negligence, and FERPA-based privacy violations, arising from communications as varied as social media posts, news reporting, blog publications, emails to third parties, statements at HOA meetings, communications between university officials, and filings in administrative proceedings.[26] If your client’s claim is based on something someone said, wrote, posted, or filed, you should anticipate a motion to strike and be prepared to marshal evidence to defeat it.

Statutory Exceptions

The Act carves out three categories of claims. The government enforcement exception exempts enforcement actions brought in the name of the state or a political subdivision by the attorney general or a district or county attorney.[27] The commercial speech exception provides that the Act does not apply to claims against a person primarily engaged in selling or leasing goods or services, where the statement or conduct arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services, insurance products, or a commercial transaction in which the intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer.[28] However, this commercial speech exception does not apply to dramatic, literary, musical, political, or artistic works.[29] Finally, an insurance exception provides that the Act does not apply to any claim brought under the Kansas insurance code or arising out of an insurance contract.[30] Plaintiff’s counsel should evaluate these exceptions early, particularly the commercial speech exception, which was an alternative ground for the decision in Neuman.[31]

IV. The Progression of Kansas Case Law

A note on precedential authority: of the Kansas Court of Appeals decisions discussed in this article, only Doe, Shepard, Williams, and Neuman are published opinions with binding precedential authority under Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 7.04. The remaining Court of Appeals decisions are unpublished memorandum opinions that may be cited for persuasive authority but are not controlling precedent under the Rule. The unpublished decisions are discussed here because they represent the only available appellate guidance on several important aspects of the statute and reveal the analytical framework the Court of Appeals has consistently applied.

The First Word: T & T Financial v. Taylor (2017)

The Court of Appeals’ first encounter with the KPSPA came in T & T Financial of Kansas City, LLC v. Taylor.[32] A coffee industry executive sued a former romantic partner for defamation and tortious interference based on allegedly disparaging blog posts and emails. The district court denied the defendant’s motion to strike on the sole ground that the defendant denied authoring some of the communications. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that step one focuses exclusively on the content of the plaintiff’s claims, not whether the defendant admits or denies the conduct.[33] Finding no Kansas caselaw on point, the panel drew persuasive authority from California’s analogous anti-SLAPP statute, a practice that has continued in virtually every subsequent Kansas decision.[34]

T & T Financial also flagged a question it did not resolve: whether blog posts and emails about personal matters in a relationship breakup qualify as speech on a “public issue or issue of public interest.”[35] The panel remanded for the district court to address this threshold question. That unresolved boundary between public and private concern has generated recurring litigation ever since.

The Foundation: Doe v. Kansas State University (2021)

Doe v. Kansas State University became the foundational published opinion construing the KPSPA.[36] A former student sued the university and an administrator after a university official disclosed the student’s disciplinary history to another institution via email. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to strike, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court confirmed de novo appellate review,[37] reinforced that step one “does not delve into the merits” but “only looks at the content of the claim,” and, because that issue was not challenged on appeal, assumed without deciding that the administrator’s email satisfied the statutory prongs.[38] The panel also rejected the argument that the Act should not protect allegedly false speech, holding that falsity is properly addressed at step two.[39]

Early Applications: Roberts (2021) and Kemmerly (2022)

In Roberts v. Goldizen, the court addressed a defamation suit by a real estate agent against a family member who posted Facebook comments about a property listing while an appeal of a prior judgment was pending.[40] The court granted the motion to strike on the defamation claim but denied it on a tortious interference with contract claim, demonstrating that the KPSPA can produce mixed results on different claims within the same case. Roberts also noted that pro se litigants may not be entitled to recover attorney fees under the KPSPA.[41]

Kemmerly v. Wichita Eagle involved a convicted murderer’s pro se defamation suit against multiple media outlets and police officers for reporting on his arrest and conviction.[42] The Court of Appeals affirmed the motion to strike, finding the plaintiff failed to produce substantial competent evidence of falsity, damages, or actual malice.[43] In response to the motion, Kemmerly offered only his own claims of innocence and an affidavit from the murder victim’s mother, who expressed personal doubts about the evidence presented at trial – but the court found these insufficient to overcome the legal fact of conviction.[44] Kemmerly is notable for the appellate court’s award of additional attorney fees for services on appeal, a reminder that fee exposure compounds as the case progresses.[45]

The Statute Outside the Pleading Context: Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission v. Shepard (2024)

Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission v. Shepard illustrates how the KPSPA operates outside its typical posture as a defense to claims asserted in a pleading. In Shepard, the Commission issued administrative subpoenas as part of an investigation into potential violations of the Kansas Campaign Finance Act and later sought judicial enforcement of those subpoenas.

Before any complaint was filed, the subpoena recipients moved to strike the enforcement applications under the KPSPA, asserting that the subpoenas implicated their First Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The procedural posture shaped the court’s analysis. Unlike the usual KPSPA case, where a defendant seeks to strike claims asserted in a pleading, the court was required to evaluate whether the Commission had shown a likelihood that it would prevail on its applications to enforce pre-complaint administrative subpoenas.

Applying the second step of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that the Commission met its burden by presenting substantial competent evidence that it was entitled to enforcement. The court further concluded that the appellants’ asserted First Amendment privilege was procedurally premature, because no discovery order had been issued and no affirmative defense had been raised in a pending action.

Shepard is significant because it illustrates that the KPSPA’s burden-shifting framework can apply even in atypical procedural settings, while also demonstrating that the statute does not displace proceedings grounded in independent statutory authority. Even where a movant satisfies step one, a claim will proceed if the responding party establishes a likelihood of prevailing under step two. And where the underlying proceeding involves a governmental investigation conducted pursuant to statutory authority, the Act does not operate to halt that process at the threshold. This reinforces that, even in atypical procedural settings, the statute’s operation still turns on the evidentiary showing required at step two.

Procedural Pitfalls: Van Meteren (2023) and S.J.M. (2025)

Van Meteren v. Suhn involved a dispute between former co-owners of a political consulting firm over an alleged breach of a noncompete clause in a buy-sell agreement. The district court granted the KPSPA motion to strike, in part, and struck one of the breach of contract claims, allowing all other claims to proceed. The Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory appeal as untimely, holding that the 14-day deadline under subsection (f)(2) is not tolled by a motion for reconsideration.[46] This is a hard, jurisdictional deadline.

S.J.M. v. K.M.A. arose from a protection from stalking petition.[47] While a timely interlocutory appeal from the denial of the KPSPA motion to strike was pending, the district court granted the petitioner’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the underlying action. The Court of Appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to do so, finding that subsection (f)(2)’s automatic stay divests the district court of authority once the appeal is docketed.[48] S.J.M. also confirmed that pro se litigants are not entitled to attorney fees under the Act.[49]

The Petition Prong Breaks Free: Williams v. Greenstein (2025)

Williams represents a significant development in KPSPA jurisprudence.[50] The plaintiff, Branden Williams, sued his former girlfriend’s mother, Barbara Greenstein, and the former girlfriend, Nichole Anderson, after Greenstein emailed Williams’s Sedgwick County probation officer regarding Williams’s other DUI matters, including a diversion in Coffey County, Kansas, and a prior DUI matter in Washington County, Iowa. The email led to further action in the Coffey County case, including the lifting of a stay under Williams’s diversion agreement, and Williams brought claims for defamation, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy. The district court denied the motion to strike. The Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion that resolved several open questions, each in the defendant’s favor.[51]

First, because motive is irrelevant at step one, speech motivated by personal interest or animosity may still qualify as protected under the free speech prong, so long as the communication is connected to a public issue.[52] Second – and this is the holding that reshapes the landscape – the petition prong does not require any connection to a public issue or issue of public interest. The statutory text of K.S.A. 60-5320(c)(5) defines the “exercise of the right to petition” by reference to multiple categories of communications that do not include a public interest requirement, including communications in or pertaining to judicial proceedings. The court rejected the argument that the statement of purpose in subsection (b) imports that requirement into every operative provision.[53] Third, a communication “pertaining to” a judicial proceeding can be protected even if it was not made in the proceeding itself; the statutory language “in or pertaining to” encompasses communications that relate to judicial proceedings even when made outside the courtroom.[54]

Williams thus expands the protective side of the statute, reinforcing that communications tied to judicial proceedings fall within the Act’s reach without any public-interest showing.

The Boundaries Take Shape: Neuman (2025) and Gumm (2025)

In Neuman v. Anesthesia Associates of Kansas City, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a motion to strike where a medical practice issued a statement to patients that a doctor had left “due to personal issues.”[55] The court found the statement was not connected to a public issue and alternatively fell within the commercial speech exception.[56] Neuman is the plaintiff’s roadmap: when a commercial enterprise communicates with its own customers about personnel matters, the Act’s protections may not apply.

Gumm v. Dixon is the mirror image.[57] Dog breeders sued social media critics for defamation based on online posts about the breeders’ practices. The Court of Appeals affirmed the motion to strike, finding the plaintiffs could not produce evidence of actual malice, factual falsity, or damages.[58] The district court awarded approximately $34,500 in attorney fees to the prevailing defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.[59] Gumm is the cautionary tale: a defamation claim that cannot survive step two will not only be stricken but will generate a mandatory fee award running against your client.

V. The KPSPA in Federal Court

The application of the KPSPA in federal court presents a distinct set of doctrinal and procedural issues. Federal courts applying the statute under Erie have generally concluded that its burden-shifting framework governs state-law claims in diversity actions, while at the same time limiting its reach with respect to federal claims and treating certain procedural provisions as inapplicable. The resulting case law reflects both adoption of the statute’s substantive framework and adaptation of its procedural features in the federal forum.

Plaintiff’s counsel contemplating a diversity-jurisdiction filing in the District of Kansas to avoid the KPSPA should abandon that strategy. In Caranchini v. Peck, Judge Murguia conducted the first Erie analysis of the KPSPA and concluded that although the Act is procedural in nature, its burden-shifting framework is so intertwined with the substantive right that it must apply in federal diversity actions.[60] The court reasoned that the Act does not conflict with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 or 56 but rather supplements them, and that declining to apply it would encourage forum shopping. The court did note, however, that the KPSPA’s 30-day hearing requirement and mandatory discovery stay may not apply in federal court, as those provisions are strictly procedural.[61]

Chief Judge Melgren reached the same conclusion in Zaid v. Boyd, and went further by striking the defamation claim at step two.[62] The plaintiff alleged only a general loss from defamation of “social acceptance and public confidence” without identifying any lost clients, lost revenue, or other specific damages.[63] The court struck the claim as insufficient: broad and factually unsupported allegations do not support a claim for damages in a defamation action.[64]

Subsequent decisions by Judge Broomes in United Capital Management of Kansas, Inc. v. Nelson[65] and Judge Robinson in CST Industries, Inc. v. Tank Connection, L.L.C.[66] have followed suit. Importantly, in CST Industries, Judge Robinson held that the KPSPA applies only to state-law claims in a diversity action and does not extend to federal-question claims, because the Erie doctrine governs the application of state law only to state-law claims in federal court.[67] This limitation is significant for practitioners, as it confines the KPSPA’s operation in federal court to state-law claims and leaves federal claims outside the statute’s reach. By contrast, where federal claims are brought in state court, the Erie limitation does not apply, and the KPSPA could potentially govern those claims, though questions of federal preemption remain unresolved.

Step-one failures can occur in federal court as well. In United Capital Management, the court denied a KPSPA motion at step one, finding that the defendant’s accusations (calling the plaintiff a pedophile and money launderer) were directed at the plaintiff personally and did not involve a public issue.[68] In Zickel v. City of Overland Park, the court denied the motion at step one where the defendant offered no meaningful analysis that the challenged communication involved a public issue and only a vague reference to a possible criminal case to support the right-to-petition theory.[69]

Finally, in Sullivan v. U.S.D. 512, Judge Crabtree acknowledged that the KPSPA is exclusively a defense mechanism. It does not create an independent cause of action.[70]

One important caveat: the treatment of the statute’s procedural features in federal court is unsettled. In United Capital Management, the court denied a discovery stay, relying on the reasoning of Caranchini, which had found the KPSPA’s stay provision strictly procedural and likely inapplicable under Erie.[71] In Zickel, a magistrate judge stayed discovery as to the KPSPA movant, relying on discretionary stay principles grounded in qualified immunity rather than the KPSPA’s automatic stay provision, and expressly leaving the applicability of that provision for the district judge to decide.[72] Plaintiff’s counsel in federal court should expect the burden-shifting framework and mandatory fee-shifting to apply, but should not assume the discovery stay will be enforced as a matter of right.

VI. Practical Considerations for Plaintiff’s Attorneys

Despite this complexity, the preceding analysis yields several concrete steps plaintiff’s counsel should take when evaluating, filing, or defending against a KPSPA motion to strike.

Evaluate KPSPA exposure before filing. Given the breadth of the statutory definitions, particularly the petition prong after Williams, most speech-based claims will satisfy step one. Anticipate that at the outset and focus your pre-filing analysis on step two: does the plaintiff have substantial competent evidence to support a prima facie case on each element?

Build the evidentiary record before you file. Because mere allegations are insufficient at step two, and because the discovery stay limits the plaintiff’s ability to develop facts through litigation, the plaintiff should have admissible evidence in hand before filing suit. Identify specific false statements. Document concrete damages: lost clients, lost revenue, specific instances of reputational injury. The plaintiffs who lost in Gumm, Kemmerly, and Zaid all failed at the same point: they could not produce specific evidence when the moment arrived.

Analyze the prongs and exceptions strategically. Force the movant to identify which specific prong applies and hold them to their burden. Evaluate whether the commercial speech exception or another statutory carve-out takes the claim outside the Act’s scope entirely. Neuman shows that exception has real teeth when the defendant is a business communicating with its own customers.

Mind the procedural deadlines. The 60-day filing window for the motion to strike (with discretionary extension) and the 14-day interlocutory appeal deadline (jurisdictional and not tolled by a motion for reconsideration) are unforgiving. Build both into your case calendar from day one.

Use the KPSPA defensively when you are the target. Attorneys sued for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, or similar claims arising from their litigation conduct are squarely within the petition prong. After Williams, no public interest connection is required. If the retaliatory suit is built on information-and-belief allegations, it will not survive step two, and the plaintiff will owe your attorney fees, so long as you do not represent yourself pro se.

Do not assert the KPSPA as an affirmative claim. It is a procedural mechanism to raise a defense – but not a cause of action.

VII. Conclusion

In the decade since its enactment, the KPSPA has become a potent pretrial weapon available to defendants in Kansas tort and business litigation. Williams effectively eliminated the public-interest gatekeeper for litigation-related speech; Doe established that mere allegations cannot survive step two. Together, they mean that any claim touching on protected activity must be backed by actual evidence at the time it is filed.

Viewed together, these cases reveal the statute’s evolving function. The KPSPA now operates as a hybrid device: it broadly protects communications in or pertaining to judicial and other governmental proceedings under the petition prong, while simultaneously imposing an early evidentiary screen that requires plaintiffs to come forward with proof before discovery begins. That combination – not any single doctrinal rule – explains why so many claims now rise or fall at the motion to strike stage.

No Kansas Supreme Court opinion has yet addressed the statute. When it does, it may refine or constrain some of these developments. But the present state of the law is clear, and plaintiff’s attorneys ignore it at their clients’ peril. Not allegations. Not theories. Not suspicions. Evidence. Anything less invites a motion to strike, mandatory fee-shifting, and a result that is worse than never filing at all.

About the Author

Russ Hazlewood is a partner at Graybill & Hazlewood LLC in Wichita, Kansas, and a Past President of the Kansas Trial Lawyers Association. His firm represented the appellant in Williams v. Greenstein, 66 Kan. App. 2d 253, 580 P.3d 43 (2025), a leading Kansas appellate decision on the Kansas Public Speech Protection Act.

Disclosure: As of this publication, the author and his firm are involved in pending litigation in the Kansas district and appellate courts involving the Kansas Public Speech Protection Act.

Endnotes

  1. K.S.A. 60-5320; L. 2016, ch. 58, § 1 (effective July 1, 2016); See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Anti-SLAPP Legal Guide, https://www.rcfp.org/anti-slapp-legal-guide/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2026) (identifying 40 states and the District of Columbia with anti-SLAPP laws as of March 2026).

  2. K.S.A. 60-5320(b).

  3. K.S.A. 60-5320(k).

  4. Kemmerly v. Wichita Eagle, No. 124,220, 2022 WL 1436399, at *6–*7 (Kan. Ct. App. May 6, 2022) (awarding appellate attorney fees of $4,692 and $6,525 to media defendants); Gumm v. Dixon, No. 127,024, 2025 WL 1155966, at *12 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2025) (awarding approximately $34,500 in attorney fees).

  5. K.S.A. 60-5320(c)(5)(A) (defining “exercise of the right to petition” to include communications in or pertaining to judicial, official, executive, legislative, and other governmental proceedings); see also Doe v. Kansas State Univ., 61 Kan. App. 2d 128, 144, 499 P.3d 1136, 1150 (2021) (holding that the statute’s protections are not limited to activity protected by the First Amendment).

  6. Williams v. Greenstein, 66 Kan. App. 2d 253, 270–272, 580 P.3d 43, 54–56 (2025) (holding that the KPSPA’s petition prong contains no public interest requirement).

  7. K.S.A. 60-5320(d); Williams, 66 Kan. App. 2d at 271.

  8. K.S.A. 60-5320(d).

  9. Id.; T & T Fin. of Kan. City, LLC v. Taylor, No. 117,624, 2017 WL 6546634, at *4–*5 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

  10. Neuman v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Kansas City, P.A., 66 Kan. App. 2d 1, 577 P.3d 559, Syl. ¶¶ 8, 10 (2025).

  11. See id. (denied at step one under free speech prong).

  12. K.S.A. 60-5320(d).

  13. Fisher v. Kansas Dep’t of Revenue, 58 Kan. App. 2d 421, 423, 471 P.3d 710 (2020) (defining “substantial competent evidence” in the administrative review context) (citing Geer v. Eby, 309 Kan. 182, 190, 432 P.3d 1001 (2019)).

  14. Doe, 61 Kan. App. 2d at 137.

  15. Id. at 148.

  16. Id.; K.S.A. 60-5320(d) (requiring the responding party to “establish a likelihood of prevailing on the claim by presenting substantial competent evidence to support a prima facie case” (emphasis added)).

  17. K.S.A. 60-5320(d) (“The fact that the court made that determination and the substance of the determination may not be admitted into evidence later in the case; and . . . the determination does not affect the burden or standard of proof in the proceeding.”).

  18. Doe, 61 Kan. App. 2d at 148 (citing DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Ct., 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 568, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (2000), as modified (January 25, 2000) (“It would defeat the obvious purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute if mere allegations in an unverified complaint would be sufficient to avoid an order to strike the complaint. Substantiation requires something more than that.”)).

  19. Id.

  20. Id. at 150.

  21. K.S.A. 60-5320(e).

  22. K.S.A. 60-5320(e)(1) (providing that the court may allow “specified and limited discovery relevant to the motion” upon a showing of good cause).

  23. K.S.A. 60-5320(c)(4), (c)(7).

  24. K.S.A. 60-5320(c)(5).

  25. K.S.A. 60-5320(c)(3).

  26. See, e.g., T & T Fin. (defamation and tortious interference claims based on blog posts and emails to third parties); Doe (defamation, negligence, and FERPA-based privacy claims arising from communications between university officials); Roberts v. Goldizen, No. 123,163, 2021 WL 5990114 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2021) (defamation and tortious interference claims based on social media posts); Kemmerly v. Wichita Eagle, No. 124,220, 2022 WL 1436399 (Kan. Ct. App. May 6, 2022) (defamation claims arising from news reporting); Kan. Governmental Ethics Comm’n v. Shepard, 65 Kan. App. 2d 1, 556 P.3d 890 (2024) (motion to strike enforcement of administrative subpoenas issued by regulatory agency in campaign finance investigation); Williams (defamation, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy claims based on email to probation officer); Gumm (defamation claims based on social media posts about business practices); King v. Bernhardt, No. 127,977, 2025 WL 420224 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2025) (defamation and privacy claims based on statements at HOA meeting).

  27. K.S.A. 60-5320(h)(1).

  28. K.S.A. 60-5320(h)(2).

  29. K.S.A. 60-5320(i).

  30. K.S.A. 60-5320(h)(3).

  31. Neuman, 66 Kan. App. 2d at 16–18 (affirming denial of motion to strike on alternative ground that statement fell within commercial speech exception under K.S.A. 60-5320(h)(2)).

  32. T & T Fin. of Kan. City, LLC v. Taylor, No. 117,624, 2017 WL 6546634 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2017).

  33. Id. at *4–*5.

  34. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 and California cases construing it); see also Doe, 61 Kan. App. 2d at 148 (same); Williams, 66 Kan. App. 2d at 262–63 (same).

  35. T & T Fin., 2017 WL 6546634, at *6.

  36. Doe v. Kansas State Univ., 61 Kan. App. 2d 128, 499 P.3d 1136 (2021).

  37. Id. at 137 (citing Nauheim v. City of Topeka, 309 Kan. 145, 149, 432 P.3d 647 (2019)).

  38. Doe, 61 Kan. App. 2d at 136; see also id. at Syl. ¶ 2.

  39. Id. at 142–44.

  40. Roberts v. Goldizen, No. 123,163, 2021 WL 5990114 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2021).

  41. Id. at *3 (citing Baker v. Hayden, 313 Kan. 667, 676, 490 P.3d 1164 (2021)).

  42. Kemmerly v. Wichita Eagle, No. 124,220, 2022 WL 1436399 (Kan. Ct. App. May 6, 2022).

  43. Id. at *6 (“Kemmerly does not establish a prima facia [sic] case that he is likely to prevail on his defamation claim.”).

  44. Id. at *3.

  45. Id. at *6–*7 (awarding appellate attorney fees of $4,692 and $6,525 to media defendants).

  46. Van Meteren v. Suhn, No. 125,220, 2023 WL 2720930, at *4–*6 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2023).

  47. S.J.M. v. K.M.A., No. 128,205, 2025 WL 2018495 (Kan. Ct. App. July 18, 2025).

  48. Id. at *2.

  49. Id. at *2–*3.

  50. Williams, 66 Kan. App. 2d 253.

  51. Id. at 254–257 (factual and procedural background).

  52. Id. at 261–262.

  53. Id., at 270–271; see also id. Syl. ¶ 2.

  54. Id. at 272; see also id., Syl. ¶ 3.

  55. Neuman v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Kansas City, P.A., 66 Kan. App. 2d 1, 577 P.3d 559 (2025).

  56. Id. at 18.

  57. Gumm v. Dixon, No. 127,024, 2025 WL 1155966 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2025).

  58. Id. at *11.

  59. Id. at *12.

  60. Caranchini v. Peck, 355 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1060–61 (D. Kan. 2018).

  61. Id. at 1061.

  62. Zaid v. Boyd, No. 22-1089-EFM, 2022 WL 4534633, at *5, *9–*10 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2022).

  63. Id. at *10.

  64. Id. at *9 (citing Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 232 Kan. 1, 5–6, 649 P.2d 1239, 1243 (1982)).

  65. United Capital Mgmt. of Kan., Inc. v. Nelson, No. 22-4008-JWB, 2022 WL 17583195 (D. Kan. Dec. 12, 2022).

  66. CST Indus., Inc. v. Tank Connection, L.L.C., No. 23-2339-JAR, 2024 WL 3360420 (D. Kan. July 9, 2024).

  67. Id. at *4.

  68. United Capital Mgmt., 2022 WL 17583195, at *4–*5; see also Smith v. Williams, No. 20-CV-2224-EFM, 2022 WL 4245479, at *10–11 (D. Kan. Sept. 14, 2022) (assuming without deciding KPSPA applies in federal court and denying motion at step one where communications about plaintiff’s non-compete and call obligations were directed at specific employers, not made in connection with a public issue).

  69. Zickel v. City of Overland Park, No. 24-CV-2506-EFM-ADM, 2025 WL 2623209, at *10–*11 (D. Kan. Sept. 11, 2025).

  70. Sullivan v. USD 512, No. 24-2491-DDC, 2025 WL 2732589, at *20 (D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2025) (dismissing KPSPA claims because the Act “provides a procedural mechanism to raise a defense — but not a cause of action”).

  71. United Capital Mgmt., No. 22-4008-JWB, 2023 WL 2242155, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 27, 2023) (denying discovery stay, finding KPSPA’s procedural provisions do not apply in federal diversity action); see also Caranchini, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 1061.

  72. Zickel, 2025 WL 1504803, at *2 (D. Kan. May 27, 2025) (staying discovery against KPSPA movant pending resolution of qualified immunity and KPSPA motion to strike, but noting that applicability of KPSPA’s automatic stay provision was for the district judge to decide).