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Deposing Sergeant Shultz: How to Address the Unprepared or Evasive Corporate Representative Designated Under Rule 30(b)(6)

July 2011 July 1, 2011

By N. Russell Hazlewood

Originally published in the Journal of the Kansas Association for Justice, Vol. 34 (July 2011). This article reflects the law as of that date.

Q. What do you know about the present location of the $3.5 million that is at issue in this litigation?

A. I know nothing.

Excerpt from deposition of a Kansas corporate defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) representative produced in London, England, to testify about “the location of the $3.5 million at issue in this litigation.” Starlight Int’l Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 636 (D. Kan. 1999).

“I know nothing, NOTHING!” — Master Sergeant Hans Georg Schultz, Hogan’s Heroes (every episode).

Trial lawyers are accustomed to facing adversaries who enjoy information advantage. In many instances, evidence and other information we need to prepare and try our cases can only be extracted from the mouths of reluctant, uncooperative or even hostile witnesses. Our most effective tool for uncovering the truth is the discovery deposition.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a) and K.S.A. § 60-230(a) provide that a party may take the deposition of any other person—including a non-party. In most instances, this can be done without leave of court by issuing an appropriate notice or subpoena. Corporations and other business organizations are deemed “persons,” subject to deposition practice.

However, as legal fictions they can testify only through natural persons. This situation presents both challenges and opportunities for the examining party.

This article is presented in the hope of promoting our search for the truth in the face of corporate stonewalling in depositions. Before addressing specific wrongs and remedies, this article will begin with a brief review of the corporate deposition procedure and its history.

Prior to 1970, the general practice in taking corporate depositions was for the examining party to designate various corporate officials to be deposed about their personal knowledge. What often ensued was a game of “Battleship,” where the examining party was required to depose countless individuals, each of whom, in turn, disclaimed personal knowledge of important facts.

In many instances, because of turnover, mergers or similar circumstances, there was simply no witness readily available to testify from personal knowledge about information that was otherwise known to the corporation. Moreover, even when knowledgeable witnesses could be found, crafty corporations would disavow unfavorable testimony on the grounds that such witnesses were not “managing agents” having authority to bind the organization.

The inefficiencies of this procedure were manifest. Consequently, the United States Supreme Court conceived a new procedure, set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), whereby a party may name an organization as the deponent, designating the matters on which examination is requested; and the organization must name persons consenting to appear and testify on its behalf with respect to matters known or reasonably available to it.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) was implemented in 1970. Kansas adopted a similar procedure the same year. Our statute, K.S.A. § 60-230(b)(6), was overhauled last year to make it congruent with federal procedure.[1] K.S.A. § 60-230(b)(6) currently provides:

Notice or subpoena directed to an organization. In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which the person designated will testify. A subpoena must advise a non-party organization of its duty to make this designation. The persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization. This subsection does not preclude a deposition by any other procedure allowed by the rules of civil procedure.

Because the state statute and the federal rule are now substantively identical, Kansas courts will presumably follow federal cases interpreting the federal rule.[2] Consequently, this article does not differentiate between the two and will generically refer to the state and federal procedure as Rule 30(b)(6).

The Advisory Committee’s commentary to the 1970 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) explains the purpose of the corporate deposition notice procedure as follows:

The new procedure . . . may be advantageous to both sides as well as an improvement in the deposition process. It will reduce the difficulties now encountered in determining, prior to the taking of a deposition, whether a particular employee or agent is a “managing agent.” It will curb the “bandying” by which officers or managing agents of a corporation are deposed in turn but each disclaims knowledge of facts that are clearly known to persons in the organization and thereby to it. The provision should also assist organizations which find that an unnecessarily large number of their officers and agents are being deposed by a party uncertain of who in the organization has knowledge.[3]

When a representative designated under Rule 30(b)(6) testifies on behalf of an organization, it will be accountable for the individual’s testimony.[4]

Once a person consents to testify on behalf of a corporation under Rule 30(b)(6), no distinction exists between the corporate representative and the corporation itself. The Rule 30(b)(6) designee does not give his personal opinion. Rather, he presents the corporation’s position on the topic.[5]

Moreover, the designated representative’s deposition enjoys a special status in that it may be used by an adversary for any purpose at a hearing or trial under both state and federal law.[6]

An organization is not required to designate its officers, directors or managing agents—or even its employees in response to a Rule 30(b)(6) notice. Instead, it may unilaterally designate any suitable individual (e.g., a former employee) to testify as its representative, so long as that person consents to testify in that capacity.[7],[8]

On the other hand, an organization cannot designate just anyone to testify on its behalf under Rule 30(b)(6).

With regard to choosing a deponent to speak on behalf of the corporation, companies ‘have a duty to make a conscientious, good-faith effort to designate knowledgeable persons . . . and to prepare them to fully and unevasively answer questions about the designated subject matter.’[9]

Notably, and because Rule 30(b)(6) explicitly requires a company to have persons testify on its behalf as to all matters reasonably available to it, [the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas] has held that the Rule ‘implicitly requires persons to review all matters known or reasonably available to [the corporation] in preparation for the 30(b)(6) deposition.’[10]

The foregoing sounds good on paper. However, the practice of stonewalling in corporate depositions is alive and well. Cagey attorneys routinely lodge improper objections to Rule 30(b)(6) notices and improperly seek to unilaterally restrict the scope of depositions in lieu of seeking protective orders.

Moreover, it is commonplace for an organization to produce a witness who is unabashedly ignorant of the topics designated in the notice—or even its content! The prevalence of this practice is an indictment not only of the lawyers and their clients who engage in stonewalling, but also on the examining lawyers who tolerate it and, in some instances, courts who condone it.

For my part, I confess that my prior ignorance has allowed opposing counsel to circumvent their clients’ Rule 30(b)(6) obligations—but no more. We have the tools to address corporate deposition stonewalling. If we make use of them more often and more effectively, we can expect that courts will better understand and apply a considerable body of favorable law.

1. Objections alone are not sufficient to allow an organization to produce a witness who is prepared to discuss only the topics as refined by its objections.

In Espy v. Mformation Technologies, Inc., the defendant made written objections and responses to the topics set out in the plaintiff’s deposition notice.[11] It unilaterally limited the scope of its representative’s testimony based on those objections, and the plaintiff filed a motion to compel. The court held that there was no authority for the proposition that “objections alone are sufficient to allow a corporation to produce a witness who is prepared to discuss only the topics as refined by Defendant’s objections.”[12]

Nor did it find authority for the defendant’s assertion that the plaintiff was obligated to seek court intervention prior to the deposition. The court held: “Defendant cannot simply file objections and then state that it will only produce general answers to the topics in accordance with its objections unless given more specific direction by the party seeking the deposition.”[13] Instead, “[t]he proper method for bringing to the Court’s attention any deficiencies in the identification of topics is to file a motion for a protective order . . . .”[14]

Caveat: Because the plaintiff had time to file a motion to compel prior to the deposition and chose not to do so (because the motion would have delayed the deposition), the court found that, “to some extent, both parties bear the blame for any wasted time in the 30(b)(6) deposition” and it exercised its discretion not to grant plaintiff attorneys fees for preparation of his motion to compel.[15]

2. A testifying organization and its lawyer cannot restrict the scope of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to the topics stated in the notice.

Counsel defending a designated representative’s deposition frequently object and instruct the witness not to answer a deposition question based on the assertion it doesn’t fall directly within a topic of inquiry designated in the notice. That objection is unfounded and should not be tolerated.

In King v. Pratt & Whitney, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida squarely considered whether a Rule 30(b)(6) designee may only be questioned regarding issues described in the notice or may be questioned as broadly as any other deponent.[16] It concluded that the “reasonable particularity” requirement of the Rule is calculated to ensure that the organization produces a witness prepared to testify, and “the scope of the deposition in the notice is the minimum about which the witness must be prepared to testify, not the maximum.”[17]

King held that Rule 30(b)(6) cannot be used to limit what is asked of a designated witness at deposition. Once the witness satisfies the minimum standard, the scope of the deposition is determined solely by relevance under Rule 26, that is, that the evidence sought may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”[18]

In reaching that conclusion, the court explained:

Rule 30(b)(6) should not be read to confer some special privilege on a corporate deponent responding to this type of notice. Clearly, Plaintiff could simply renotice a deponent under the regular notice provisions and ask him the same questions that were objected to. However, Plaintiff should not be forced to jump through that extra hoop absent some compelling reason. Rather, the Rule is best read as follows:

1) Rule 30(b)(6) obligates the responding corporation to provide a witness who can answer questions regarding the subject matter listed in the notice.

2) If the designated deponent cannot answer those questions, then the corporation has failed to comply with its Rule 30(b)(6) obligations and may be subject to sanctions, etc. The corporation has an affirmative duty to produce a representative who can answer questions that are both within the scope of the matters described in the notice and are “known or reasonably available” to the corporation. Rule 30(b)(6) delineates this affirmative duty.

3) If the examining party asks questions outside the scope of the matters described in the notice, the general deposition rules govern (i.e. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)), so that relevant questions may be asked and no special protection is conferred on a deponent by virtue of the fact that the deposition was noticed under 30(b)(6).

4) However, if the deponent does not know the answer to questions outside the scope of the matters described in the notice, then that is the examining party’s problem.

This interpretation does not render the “describe with reasonable particularity” language “superfluous”; rather, it imposes an obligation on a corporation to provide someone who can indeed answer the particular questions presaged by the notice. Rule 30(b)(6) does not limit what can be asked at deposition.[19]

King accurately states the law in this jurisdiction as well. In Starlight Int’l Inc. v. Herlihy, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas held that King “succinctly set forth the applicable principals with regard to depositions under Fed. R. Civ. P. (30)(b)(6).”[20] The Kansas Federal Court quoted and adopted the enumerated paragraphs from King set forth above.[21] The same conclusion was reached in Payless Shoesource v. Target, wherein the court held:

...when the party objects to the questions posed by the examining party as outside the scope of matters noticed in Rule 30(b)(6) the general deposition rules govern (i.e. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)), so that relevant questions may be asked and no special protection is conferred on a deponent by virtue of the fact that the deposition was noticed under 30(b)(6).[22]

In light of the foregoing, we need not suffer opposing counsel’s attempt to limit the scope of a representative’s deposition to the topics stated in the notice. If the witness has personal knowledge of other discoverable facts, go for it.

3. An organization cannot avoid Rule 30(b)(6) by asserting there is no witness with personal or direct knowledge of the areas of inquiry.

An organization will not be permitted to “undermine [Rule 30(b)(6)] by responding that no witness is available who personally has direct knowledge concerning the areas of inquiry.”[23] The Rule imposes an affirmative duty on the responding party to marshal all information “known or reasonably available” to it regarding the designated subject matter and,

...not only produce such number of persons as will satisfy the request, but more importantly, prepare them so that they may give complete, knowledgeable and binding answers on behalf of the corporation.[24]

An organization is not relieved of its obligations under Rule 30(b)(6) merely because it no longer has an employee with knowledge on the designated topics. In United States v. Taylor, the court recognized that it is not uncommon to find that a corporation no longer employs individuals who have memory of distant events, or to find that individuals with knowledge are deceased. It explained:

An individual’s personal memory is no more extensive than his or her life. However, a corporation has a life beyond that of mortals. Moreover, it can discharge its “memory,” i.e. employees, and they can voluntarily separate themselves from the corporation. Consequently, it is not uncommon to have a situation . . . where a corporation indicates that it no longer employs individuals who have memory of a distant event or that such individuals are deceased. These problems do not relieve a corporation from preparing its Rule 30(b)(6) designee to the extent matters are reasonably available, whether from documents, past employees, or other sources. Of course, just like in the instance of an individual deponent, the corporation may plead lack of memory. However, if it wishes to assert a position based on testimony from third parties, or their documents, the designee still must present an opinion as to why the corporation believes the facts should be so construed. The attorney for the corporation is not at liberty to manufacture the corporation’s contentions. Rather, the corporation may designate a person to speak on its behalf and it is this position which the attorney must advocate.[25]

If a knowledgeable witness is not readily available, the organization may be required to make one. “If need be, the responding party ‘must prepare deponents by having them review prior fact witness deposition testimony as well as documents and deposition exhibits.’”[26] In addition, an organization has a duty to designate more than one deponent if necessary to respond to relevant areas of inquiry on the noticed topics.[27]

4. A corporation generally will not be permitted to avoid Rule 30(b)(6) based on the assertion that preparing a suitable witness would be burdensome.

In Starlight, the court held:

Rule 30(b)(6) implicitly requires the designated representative to review all matters known or reasonably available to it in preparation for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. . . . . The Court understands that preparing for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition can be burdensome. However, this is merely the result of the concomitant obligation from the privilege of being able to use the corporate or other organizational form in order to conduct business.[28]

If the testifying organization seeks a protective order on this ground, the examining party should require it to make a showing of undue burden, and not merely the burden incident to its chosen organizational structure.

5. If, during the course of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition it becomes apparent that the designated witness is not prepared to testify about a designated matter, a suitable witness must be promptly substituted.

In Starlight, the court held:

If the designated persons do not possess personal knowledge of the matters set out in the deposition notice, the entity is obligated to prepare the designees so that they may give knowledgeable and binding answers for the organization. If it becomes obvious during the course of a deposition that the designee is deficient, the organization is obligated to provide a substitute.[29]

Consequently, as soon as it becomes apparent that the designee is unprepared or otherwise unsuitable, it would be wise for the examining party to make inquiry as to who might be knowledgeable and demand a substitute on the record.

6. An organization cannot avoid Rule 30(b)(6) by asserting that the only possible designees are the organization’s attorneys.

Sometimes, an organization subject to a Rule 30(b)(6) notice will improperly seek to hide behind its lawyers. For example, Sprint Communications v. Theglobe.com involved claims by Sprint that the defendant had infringed its patents.[30]

The defendant issued a Rule 30(b)(6) notice seeking testimony about the “preparation and filing” of Sprint’s patents and certain amendments thereto. The federal district court rejected Sprint’s assertion that it should be relieved of its obligations under Rule 30(b)(6) because its attorneys were “the only corporate employees with knowledge regarding the subjects listed in the Notice.”[31] In so ruling, the court explained:

[P]ersonal knowledge of the designated subject matter by the selected deponent is of no consequence. Sprint is obligated to produce a deponent who has been competently prepared by the company to give complete, knowledgeable and binding answers on behalf of the corporation. It is Sprint’s decision who to designate as its representative in the deposition. Sprint is under no obligation to choose an attorney as its 30(b)(6) designee.

Sprint may adequately comply with the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice by choosing one or more nonattorney deponents—regardless of prior and/or personal knowledge regarding the subject matter—and having them review memoranda, notes, applications, documents and all other matters “reasonably available” to the corporation that are related to preparing, filing and revising each Patent. Considering Sprint’s desire to protect disclosure of privileged information and materials, counsel may wish to exercise caution in preparing the witness or witnesses with privileged information or documents, otherwise the privilege may be waived.[32]

7. An organization cannot refuse to permit inquiry about underlying factual information from its designated Rule 30(b)(6) representative even though such information was transmitted through or from the organization’s lawyers.

Nor may an organization subject to Rule 30(b)(6) conceal information used to prepare the designated witness by filtering it through a lawyer. In the Sprint case discussed above, Sprint further objected to the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition based on the attorney-client privilege, asserting that “all information pertaining to the subjects listed in the Notice are protected from disclosure by attorney-client privilege as a result of the fact that Sprint attorneys were involved in prosecuting the patents at issue” in the litigation.[33]

The court held that Sprint had not met its burden of establishing the objection, which was likely premature, because the deposition was yet to occur. It further explained:

[T]he attorney-client privilege does not protect facts communicated to an attorney. Moreover, clients cannot refuse to disclose facts which their attorneys conveyed to them and which the attorneys obtained from independent sources. When a corporation produces an employee under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) to testify to corporate knowledge, the employee must provide responsive underlying factual information even though such information was transmitted through or from corporate lawyers.[34]

8. An organization may be sanctioned if it fails or refuses to make a conscientious, good-faith effort to designate knowledgeable persons or to prepare them to fully and unevasively answer questions about the designated subject matter. That is tantamount to a failure to produce any witness at all.

In Starlight, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to defraud it and violated securities laws in connection with the investment of $3.5 million.[35] Some of the defendants were organizations.

The plaintiff issued a Rule 30(b)(6) notice to defendant 21st Century Group. It pretended its principal place of business was in London, England, and convinced the court to issue a protective order requiring the plaintiff to depose its corporate representative there.[36] (Around the same time, it filed a separate lawsuit in the District of Kansas alleging it was a resident of the State of Kansas).

Throughout his deposition in London, the designated corporate representative claimed ignorance about matters for inquiry identified in the deposition notices. For example, the plaintiff’s notice indicated it intended to inquire into the accounts and location of the $3.5 million at issue in this litigation.

As if channeling Sergeant Schultz, the corporate representative testified as follows:

Q. ... What do you know about the present location of the $3.5 million that is at issue in this litigation?

A. I know nothing.

. . . . .

Q. ... and what knowledge do you have as to what disposition was made of this money once it went to the Public Bank in Labaun?

A. None.

Q. So you have not discussed that at all with Mr. Herlihy; is that correct?

A. We have had discussion. My understanding is that the money was used in creating a syndicated loan and maintaining it for the purpose of complying with the terms of the Verkruisen contract.

Q. How were the funds used in creating the syndicated loan?

A. I don’t know.

Q. To whom were the funds paid in the course of creating this syndicated loan?

A. I don’t know.

Q. To what accounts were the funds transferred once they reached the Public Bank in Labaun?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Do you know anything about where the funds went after they reached the account ... in Public Bank, Labaun?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any knowledge as to whether any of the funds that were sent into that account, the Public Bank in Labaun, remain in that account today?

A. I don’t know.[37]

It was later determined his testimony was both incorrect and incomplete. The plaintiff moved for sanctions, and the court granted them, finding:

Defendants 21st Century and Miller Group have not adequately explained their failure to properly prepare [the designated representative] for deposition… Foremost among the purposes of the Rule is to “curb the ‘bandying’ by which officers or managing agents of a corporation are deposed in turn but each disclaims knowledge of facts that are clearly known to persons in the organization and thereby to it. For a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to operate effectively, the deposing party must designate the areas of inquiry with reasonable particularity, and the corporation must designate and adequately prepare witnesses to address these matters. If the rule is to promote effective discovery regarding corporations the spokesperson must be informed.

…

[The designated representative’s] deposition reflects inadequate preparation and knowledge as a witness with respect to [topics] of the areas of inquiry set forth in the deposition notice. He failed to make necessary inquiries about relevant topics. He also made no effort to review his own files or those of 21st Century or Miller Group other than those provided to him by counsel… Had defendants been concerned about the time to prepare [him], they could have raised the issue at the status conference… They did not do so. Instead they allowed plaintiff to travel to London, England, to depose a poorly prepared party representative. The witness remained substantially unprepared, furthermore, when plaintiff deposed him for a second time [two months later].[38]

The court further held that producing an unprepared witness for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition “is tantamount to a failure to appear at a deposition,” and therefore constitutes sanctionable conduct under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A), which provides:

The court where the action is pending may, on motion, order sanctions if . . . a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) . . . fails, after being served with proper notice, to appear for that person’s deposition.[39]

Other courts reaching the same conclusion have likened the ignorant corporate representative to “a deponent who physically appears for the deposition but sleeps through it.”[40]

Under the Starlight framework, if a Rule 30(b)(6) witness is not adequately prepared to testify about topics properly identified in a notice to take the deposition, the court may impose various types of sanctions, including the imposition of reasonable attorneys fees and expenses caused by the failure, unless the failure was “substantially justified.”[41] Those sanctions may be imposed on the party failing to act, the attorney advising the party, or both.[42]

The Starlight court concluded that substantial monetary sanctions were appropriate in light of the defendants’ and defense counsel’s deliberate tactic of delaying or otherwise failing to provide requested discovery. It directed the plaintiff to file an affidavit of time and expenses incurred as a result of the sanctionable misconduct so an appropriate amount could be determined in subsequent proceedings.[43]

Other reported cases also reflect the courts’ willingness to impose significant monetary sanctions to redress and deter Rule 30(b)(6) misconduct. For example, in Cherrington Asia Ltd. v. A & L Underground, Inc., the U.S. District of Kansas recently issued an order requiring a corporate defendant to pay $26,382.99 for failure to properly prepare witnesses under the rule.[44]

The Starlight analysis should be equally applicable to K.S.A. § 60-237(d)(1)(A)(I), the Kansas statute authorizing sanctions where a corporate representative fails to appear at a deposition.

Sergeant Schultz repeatedly professed his ignorance—but he really did have knowledge of what was going on around him. Properly brandished, Rule 30(b)(6) will allow you to get beyond Sergeant Schultz and get to Colonel Klink perhaps on the other side’s nickel. The law discussed above is neither novel nor new, but it is effective. Let’s do what we can to make it is well known to opposing counsel and the courts.

Endnotes

  1. Laws 2010, ch. 135, § 99, eff. July 1, 2010.

  2. See Fredricks v. Foltz, 221 Kan. 28, 30, 557 P. 2d 1252, 1255 (1976) (where state court rule is identical to federal rule, federal interpretations of federal rule are persuasive).

  3. Advisory Committee Notes, to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), 48 F. R. D. at 514.

  4. Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 236 F. R. D. 524, 527 (D. Kan. 2006).

  5. Id.

  6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); K.S.A. § 60-232(a)(3).

  7. 48 F.R.D. at 514.

  8. The requirement that a witness consent to testify permits an employee or agent who has an independent or conflicting interest in the litigation (or any other reason) to refuse to testify on behalf of the organization. Advisory Committee Notes, to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), 48 F. R. D. at 514.

  9. Sprint, 236 F. R. D. at 527 (quoting Starlight, 186 F.R.D. at 639).

  10. Id. at 527-528 (quoting T & W Funding Co. XII, L.L.C. v. Pennant Rent–A–Car, 210 F.R.D. 730, 735 (D. Kan. 2002)).

  11. Espy v. Mformation Technologies, Inc., No. 082211EFMDWB, 2010 WL 1488555 (D. Kan. Apr. 13, 2010).

  12. Id., 2010 WL 1488555 at * 3.

  13. Id.

  14. Id.

  15. Id.

  16. King v. Pratt & Whitney, a Div. of United Technologies Corp., 161 F. R. D. 475, 475 (S. D. Fla. 1995) aff’d sub nom. King v. Pratt & Whitney, 213 F.3d 646 (11th Cir. 2000) and aff’d sub nom. King v. Pratt & Whitney, 213 F.3d 647 (11th Cir. 2000).

  17. Detoy v. City & County of San Francisco, 196 F.R.D. 362, 366 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing King v. Pratt & Whitney, 161 F. R. D. at 476).

  18. Id.

  19. 161 F. R. D. at 476 (emphasis added).

  20. 186 F. R. D. at 638.

  21. Id.

  22. Payless Shoesource Worldwide, Inc. v. Target Corp., No. CIV.A. 05-4023-JAR, 2008 WL 973118, *9 (D. Kan. Apr. 8, 2008) (citing Starlight, 186 F. R. D. at 639).

  23. Sprint, 236 F. R. D. at 528 (citing Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164 F. R. D. 70, 75-76 (D. Neb. 1995); United States v. Taylor, 166 F. R. D. 356, 361, aff’d, 166 F. R. D. 367 (M. D. N. C. 1996)).

  24. Id., 236 F. R. D. at 538 (quoting Marker v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 125 F. R. D. 121, 126 (M.D.N.C.1989)).

  25. 166 F. R. D. at 361-362.

  26. Starlight, 186 F. R. D. at 638.

  27. Id. (corporation must produce “such number of persons as will satisfy the request”).

  28. Id. (emphasis added; quoting Taylor, 166 F. R. D. at 362).

  29. Id. (citing Dravo, 164 F. R. D. at 75); accord., Univ. of Kansas v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1226 (D. Kan. 2008).

  30. Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 236 F. R. D. 524, 527 (D. Kan. 2006).

  31. Id. at 528.

  32. Id.

  33. Id. at 529.

  34. Id. (emphasis added).

  35. 186 F. R. D. at 633.

  36. 186 F.R.D. at 645.

  37. 186 F.R.D. at 637-638.

  38. 186 F.R.D. at 638-639.

  39. 186 F.R.D. at 639, citing Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 363.

  40. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Horizon, Inc., 250 F. R. D. 203, 217 (E. D. Pa. 2008).

  41. 186 F.R.D. at 639 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3)).

  42. Id.

  43. Id. at 650.

  44. Cherrington Asia Ltd. v. A & L Underground, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 653, 663 (D. Kan. 2010).