Sweet Ambiguity: Preserving Liability Coverage With the Separation of Insureds Provision
By N. Russell Hazlewood
Originally published in the Journal of the Kansas Association for Justice, Vol. 32, No. 3 (January 2009). This article reflects the law as of that date.
This will be the first of what I hope will become a series of concise, practical skills articles narrowly focusing on important provisions of insurance polices and nuances in Kansas insurance law that are helpful in recognizing and establishing coverage. Here, we will discuss the effect of a “separation of insureds” provision in a liability insurance policy on the construction and effect of exclusions tied to the conduct or property rights of “an insured” “the insured,” or “any insured,” under Kansas law. At first blush, the issue may seem esoteric; but if you regularly handle cases involving tort claims, it will come up.
Separation of Insureds
Many liability insurance forms include a “separation of insureds” provision in the conditions section. Others include a separation of insureds provision in the definition of “insured.” This provision may also be referred to as a “severability” clause or a “severability of interests” clause.
By way of example, a Hartford Business Liability Coverage Form issued to one of my clients this year contains a typical provision:
E. Liability and Medical Expenses General Conditions.
. . . .
5. Separation of Insureds
Except with respect to the Limits of Insurance, and any rights or duties specifically assigned to the Named Insured, this insurance applies:
a. As if each Named Insured were the only Named Insured; and
b. Separately to each insured against whom a claim is made or “suit” is brought.”[1]
Similar provisions may be found following ISO standard liability insurance forms: Businessowners Liability Coverage;[2] Auto Coverage;[3] Garage Coverage;[4] Truckers Coverage;[5] Electronic Data Liability Coverage;[6] Employment-Related Practices Coverages;[7] Commercial General Liability Coverage;[8] General Liability–Miscellaneous Endorsements;[9] Owners and Contractors Protective Liability Coverage;[10] Products/Completed Operations Liability Coverage;[11] Pollution Liability Coverage;[12] Railroad Protective Liability Coverage;[13] Underground Storage Tank Policy Designated Tanks;[14] Excess Indemnity (Umbrella) Policy, Commercial;[15] Excess Indemnity (Umbrella) Policy, Personal;[16] General Liability Insurance–Standard Provisions;[17] Homeowners Composite Form;[18] Homeowners Personal Injury Endorsement;[19] Fine Arts Coverage Form, Commercial;[20] Hospital Professional Liability Coverage;[21] Allied Health Care Providers Professional Liability Coverage;[22] and Physicians, Surgeons, and Dentists Professional Liability Coverage.[23]
Similar provisions are also common in liability forms prepared by other standard form publishers and liability insurers who, like Hartford, undertake to write their own forms. Separation of insureds provisions are also common (and desirable) in directors and officers liability policy forms.
While it has become common for liability insurance to be packaged with other insurances, e.g., fire insurance, a separation of insureds provision will likely apply only to a liability claim or suit.[24] However, separation of insureds provisions have been construed to apply to the liability form as a whole, and not merely to exclusionary language.
A separation of insureds provision confirms that liability protection is to be afforded “separately to each insured.” In other words, the coverage is broadened by a fiction that each liability insured has been issued a separate insurance policy, excepting only that a combined single liability limit will apply, and certain rights and duties may be specifically assigned to the Named Insured(s).
“an insured” and “the insured” Exclusions
One consequence of the fiction created by a separation of insureds provision is that an exclusion tied to the activity or property rights of “the insured” or “an insured” will be construed to apply only to the person seeking liability coverage under the policy. For example, in Rose Constr. Co. v. Gravatt, 231 Kan. 196, 642 P.2d 569 (1982), a tenant’s employee backed the tenant’s truck into the landlord’s building, causing property damage to the building. The truck was insured by Farmers Insurance Company, which denied coverage for the landlord’s claim against the driver based on an exclusion for “damage to…property rented to or in charge of the insured…. ”[25] The landlord obtained a judgment against the driver and filed a garnishment against Farmers. The trial court found that the exclusion barred coverage for the driver, and it dismissed the garnishment with prejudice.
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the landlord. In so ruling, the Supreme Court explained that “[a]n automobile insurance policy containing exclusionary and severability interests is construed to require that the exclusions are applied only against the insured for whom coverage is sought.”[26] While the Supreme Court expressly found that “[t]he damaged property was rented to the tenant, who was in charge and control thereof,” it also found that the driver, i.e., “the employee for exclusionary purposes,” “neither rent[ed], ha[d] charge of, nor control[led] the damaged property.”[27] Thus, the exclusion was inapplicable to the claim against the driver.
A similar issue was presented ten years later, in Catholic Diocese of Dodge City v. Raymer, 16 Kan. App. 2d. 488, 825 P.2d 1144 (1992). Anthony Haemmeke, a minor, vandalized a school owned by the Catholic Diocese. The Diocese sued Anthony for intentional vandalism and also sued his parents, Allan and Brenda Haemmeke, claiming the property damage resulted from their failure to exercise reasonable parental care in the control and supervision of Anthony.
Farmers Insurance Company, the Haemmekes’ homeowners insurer, denied coverage to Allan and Brenda Haemmeke based, in part, on an exclusion for property damage “caused intentionally by or at the direction of an insured . . . .”[28] The Diocese obtained a default judgment against Allan and Brenda Haemmeke and instituted a garnishment proceeding against Farmers. The trial court granted summary judgment to Farmers, finding that the exclusion applied. On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, with instructions to enter judgment for the Diocese.
As in Rose, the appellate decision in Raymer turned on the inconsistency between the separation of insureds provision and the language of the exclusion asserted by Farmers. The Court of Appeals began its analysis by applying the well-established rule that “exceptions, limitations, and exclusions to insuring agreements require a narrow construction on the theory that the insurer, having affirmatively expressed coverage through broad promises, assumes a duty to define any limitations on that coverage in clear and explicit terms.”[29] It found that the separation of insureds clause in the policy “made ambiguous the otherwise unambiguous language of the exclusion for intentional acts by an insured.”[30]
Citing Rose, the Court of Appeals held that, in construing exclusionary and severability of interests clauses of Farmer’s policy, the exclusions were to be applied only against insured for whom coverage was sought. Consequently, the intentional act exclusion did not apply to the claims against Allan and Brenda Haemmeke for negligently supervising their minor child. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the opinion in Catholic Diocese of Dodge City v. Raymer, 251 Kan. 689, 840 P.2d 456 (1992).
“any insured” Exclusions
Another consequence of the fiction created by a separation of insureds provision, in Kansas, is that an exclusion tied to the activity or property rights of “any insured” will be also be construed to apply only to the person seeking liability coverage under the policy. This issue was squarely addressed by the Kansas Supreme Court in Brumley v. Lee, 265 Kan. 810, 963 P.2d 1224 (1998).
Kimberlee Lee was the emancipated adult daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Brumley. Kimberlee and her husband, David Lee, abused her four year-old brother, Douglas Brumley, when he was in their care. Kimberlee struck Douglas in the abdomen, causing fatal injuries. She and David Lee were later convicted of crimes relating to the abuse and death of Douglas.
Mr. and Mrs. Brumley sued David Lee for negligently causing or contributing to Douglas’ death. David Lee’s homeowners insuror, Safeco, denied coverage for David under its policy. David asserted a third-party indemnity claim against Safeco. The Brumleys and Safeco stipulated that if the court decided that the policy provided coverage, then Safeco would pay the Brumleys the policy limit of $100,000. The claims against David were dismissed, and the case continued as a declaratory judgment action on the coverage issue.
The Safeco policy excluded coverage for bodily injury which was “expected or intended by any insured” while at the same time indicating the insurance “applies separately to each insured.”[31] Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment for Safeco, based upon its finding that the exclusion was controlling.
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment. Discussing Raymer, it rejected Safeco’s argument that tying an exclusion to the conduct of “any insured” compelled a different result than use of “an insured” or “each insured.”[32] The Supreme Court found the use of the term “any insured” in the exclusion was also ambiguous in light when read in pari materia with the policy’s separation of insured’s provision:
The words “an” and “any” are inherently indefinite and ambiguous. The two words can and often do have the same meaning. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 68 (1973) gives many definitions for the word “any.” The first definition listed is “one, a, an, or some.” Correspondingly, the Random House Dictionary includes the word “any” among its definitions for the word “a” or “an.” Hence, the words may have the same meaning. Thus, the word “any” is not materially different from the word “a” or “an,” and, contrary to the district court’s ruling, Safeco’s use of “any” instead of “an” in its policy does not eliminate the ambiguity created by the policy’s severability clause.[33]
Construing the severability clause in light of this ambiguity, the Supreme Court determined that Safeco’s policy afforded liability coverage for a negligent insured, even if the accident also involved the intentional act of a co-insured:
With the severability clause each insured, in effect, has his or her own insurance policy. When looked at in that light, the ambiguity is easier to see. There are a number of insureds (in essence separate policies—one for each insured) in most instances because homeowner’s policies define insureds as residents of the household. Thus, if residents of a household include two parents and two teenage sons, there are four insureds. If the two teenagers vandalize a building and the parents are sued for negligence, the exclusions are applied only against the insureds for whom coverage is sought. Here, the insurance company added one letter—a “y”—to a single word in the insurance policy and thus claims a purchaser of that policy should realize that he or she has no coverage for a negligent act if the claim is a result of the intentional act of an insured other than the insured who the injured party claims to be negligent, such as one who is alleged to be negligent in supervising a minor or someone who is mentally ill or senile. We do not believe adding one letter—a “y”—to “an” eliminates the ambiguity we recognized in Raymer.
We acknowledge a line of cases contrary to this holding. However, we believe the policy to be ambiguous and refer those who are interested to the Random House Dictionary of the English Language: Transport Indem. Co. v. Wyatt, 417 So.2d 568 (Ala.1982); Premier Ins. Co. v. Adams, 632 So.2d 1054 (Fla. Dist. App.1994); and Worcester Mutual Ins. Co. v. Marnell, 398 Mass. 240, 496 N.E.2d 158 (1986).[34]
In light of these decisions, where more than one liability insured is involved, you should not overlook the potential impact of a separation of insureds provision on coverage. (Nor should you ever accept a denial, at face value, from Farmers or Safeco).
Endnotes
Hartford Casualty Insurance Company Form SS 00 08 04 05 at p. 16.
ISO Form BP 00 06 06 89 at p. 9, Section E(5).
ISO Form CA 00 01 07 97 at p. 9, Section V(F).
ISO Form CA 00 05 07 97 at p. 14, Section VI(G).
ISO Form CA 00 12 07 97 at p. 11, Section VI(F).
ISO Form CG 00 65 12 04 at p. 4, Section IV(7).
ISO Form EP 00 01 10 02 at p. 4, Section V(H).
ISO Form CG 00 01 12 04 at p. 12, Section IV(7).
ISO Form CG 03 00 01 96.
ISO Form CG 00 09 12 04 at p. 5, Section IV(11).
ISO Form 00 37 12 04 at p. 7, Section IV(7).
ISO Form CG 00 39 12 04 at p. 7, Section IV(7).
ISO Form CG 00 35 12 04 at p. 5, Section IV(B)(3).
ISO Form CG 00 42 12 04 at p. 7, Section (IV)(7).
ISO Form CU 00 01 09 00 at p. 10, Section (IV)(7).
ISO Form DL 98 01 06 98 at p. 7, Section VI(I).
ISO Form GL 00 00 01 73 at p. 4 (in definition of “insured”).
ISO Form HO 00 03 10 00 at p. 20, Section II(B).
ISO Form 24 82 10 00 at p. 2, Section II(B).
ISO Form 00 42 07 90 at p. 1, Section B.
ISO Form PR 00 03 12 97 at p. 4, Section IV(7).
ISO Form PR 00 05 12 97 at p. 5, Section IV(7).
ISO Form PR 00 01 12 97 at p. 5, Section IV(7).
See Pink Cadillac Bar and Grill, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 22 Kan. App. 2d 944, 925 P.2d 452 (1996) (based upon specific language and organization of the policy, severability or separation of insurance clause applied to liability actions and not actions to enforce property coverage; coverage for innocent co-insured was unavailable in light of material misrepresentation of fact by his partner).
231 Kan. at 197.
231 Kan. 196, at Syl. 1.
231 Kan. at 197-198.
16 Kan. App. 2d at 490.
16 Kan. App. 2d at 497 (citing Upland Mutual Ins., Inc. v. Noel, 214 Kan. 145, 519 P.2d 737 (1974). See also Prickett v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 294, 301 (10th Cir. 1960) (applying Kansas law; citing, inter alia, Spence v. New York Life Ins. Co., 154 Kan. 379, 118 P.2d 514 (1941)) (general rule that ambiguity is construed against the drafter applies with “particular force” to an ambiguous or doubtful provision in a policy or in an endorsement that attempts to exclude liability coverage).
16 Kan. App. 2d at 497.
265 Kan. at 813.
265 Kan. at 814-815.
265 Kan. at 814-815.
265 Kan. at 815.