Nixing the Catch-22: Recovery of Replacement Cost Value When Repair or Replacement is Frustrated by the Insurer
By N. Russell Hazlewood
Originally published in the Journal of the Kansas Association for Justice, Vol. 35 (March 2012). This article reflects the law as of that date.
Property insurers give policyholders the option of insuring property based on actual cash value (ACV) or replacement cost value (RCV). Because it would be impossible to replace some categories of damaged property (e.g., a shingle roof) with anything other than new, many consumers of insurance conclude it makes good sense to spring for the extra cost of RCV coverage, which insurance companies are only too happy to sell them.
However, all too often, these consumers find themselves in a catch-22 when, after a loss, they attempt to access their insurance policy’s replacement cost value coverage; they must repair or replace damaged or missing property before the insurer is obligated to pay; and/or the insurer denies coverage, refuses to make a partial, ACV payment, or otherwise refuses to facilitate repair or replacement by withholding assurance that it will pay if and when repair or replacement is completed. This article is intended to aid policyholders and their counsel in understanding and addressing such misconduct.
The pertinent provisions relating to actual cash value and replacement cost value are typically found in the conditions of an RCV policy under “Loss Settlement.” While policy language varies, a standard ISO homeowners coverage form provides:
C. Loss Settlement
…Covered property losses are settled as follows:
. . .
2. Buildings covered under Coverage A or B at replacement cost without deduction for depreciation, subject to the following:
a. …[W]e will pay the cost to repair or replace, after application of any deductible and without deduction for depreciation, but not more than the least of the following amounts:
(1) The limit of liability under this policy that applies to the building;
(2) The replacement cost of that part of the building damaged with material of like kind and quality and for like use; or
(3) The necessary amount actually spent to repair or replace the damaged building…
. . .
d. We will pay no more than the actual cash value of the damage until actual repair or replacement is complete. Once actual repair or replacement is complete, we will settle the loss as noted . . . above.
…
e. You may disregard the replacement cost loss settlement provisions and make claim under this policy for loss to buildings on an actual cash value basis. You may then make claim for any additional liability according to the provisions of this Condition C. Loss Settlement, provided you notify us of your intent to do so within 180 days after the date of loss.[1]
A typical ACV clause is not an exclusion from coverage, and it does not establish a rule for determining loss — it simply imposes a limitation on the amount that may be recovered. In some instances, the term “actual cash value” is clearly defined in the policy. In many others, it is not.
Where “actual cash value” is not explicitly defined in a policy, courts have struggled with its application, applying various tests including, inter alia: “cost to repair without any reduction for depreciation;”[2] “replacement cost minus depreciation;”[3] market value;[4] or some combination of thereof.[5]
A Kansas amendatory endorsement promulgated by the Kansas Insurance Department defines “actual cash value” as “the amount it would cost to repair or replace lost or damaged covered property with material of like-kind and quality, less allowance for deterioration and depreciation, including obsolescence.”
Even that definition leaves significant room for confusion and disagreement. This article makes no attempt to comprehensively answer questions involved in proof of actual cash value, since that would involve a much broader discussion. However, for purposes of addressing the issues discussed below, it will be assumed that actual cash value would be less than replacement cost value.
In most instances, an RCV policy, like the coverage form quoted above, permits the insurer to tender the actual cash value amount while withholding the difference between replacement cost value and actual cash value; and the insured will not be entitled to recover the depreciation or “holdback” unless and until the damaged property is repaired or replaced — and then only to the extent that the amount actually spent exceeds the actual cash value payment.
Many policies impose time limitations for the insured to commence or complete repair or replacement; others impose deadlines for the insured to give notice of intent to make repairs and claim replacement cost value.
But what happens if the insurer denies the claim or refuses to tender the full amount of actual cash value to the policyholder in the first instance? The author’s anecdotal experience suggests that some insurers doing business in Kansas engage in a scheme to limit their exposure under RCV policies to actual cash value by denying claims or withholding payments and thereby making it difficult or impossible for the policyholder to fund repair or replacement of covered, damaged property within the time allotted in the policy.
While the Kansas appellate courts have not squarely addressed this issue in a reported opinion, courts in other jurisdictions have adopted a number of theories to prevent insurers from profiting from this type of misconduct. The following is a non-exhaustive survey of those theories.
1. Prevention of Performance (the “Universal Rule”): A contract condition is excused if the occurrence of the condition is prevented by the party whose performance is dependent upon the condition.
In Bailey v. Farmers Union Co-Operative Ins. Co. of Nebraska, 498 N.W.2d 591 (1992), the plaintiff, Ms. Bailey, hired a contractor to build a basement under her existing home in Omaha, Neb. Shortly after the project began, the house collapsed into the excavation hole, resulting in a total loss.
The cause of collapse was determined to be an inadequate temporary bracing system utilized to support the structure during the excavation operation.[6]
At the time of the loss, Bailey suffered from lupus and was on full disability. Consequently, the loss had a devastating impact on her and her family. For the first few days after the loss, she and her children slept on the lawn. Against her doctor’s advice, she had to get a job in order to obtain an apartment, pay the rent, and stay current on her mortgage payments.[7]
Bailey’s home was insured by Farmers Union for replacement cost value up to $52,000, without deduction for depreciation. The policy obligated Farmers Union to cover the least expensive of three alternatives:
(1) the $52,000 limit of liability under the policy that applied to the home,
(2) the replacement cost of the home for like construction and use on the same premises, or
(3) the necessary amount actually spent to repair or replace the home.
Regarding expenditures to repair or replace, Farmers Union was obligated to pay no more than the actual cash value of the damage unless and until the actual repair or replacement was complete.[8]
Five days after the loss, Farmers Union internally conceded Bailey’s claim was covered and so advised her mortgage company. However, in its dealings with Bailey, the insurer aggressively resisted the claim, feigning that it was “doubtful and disputed.”
For more than seven months after the loss, Farmer’s Union attempted to force Bailey to accept $11,900 (its assertion of the actual cash value of her home less her $100 deductible), in full settlement of her claim. It threatened that if she did not accept, it “would have no alterative” but to withdraw the offer and defend itself in court.[9]
Bailey very much wanted to rebuild her home on site. She rejected the insurer’s offer and declared her intention to exercise the option in the policy allowing her to make an immediate claim for actual cash value of the home and then claim within 180 days of the loss the actual replacement cost of rebuilding the home, less the actual cash value received. She demanded $16,700 in actual cash value and explained that she intended to claim another $35,500 in additional replacement costs.[10]
Farmers Union responded that “the actual cash value figure was the total value of the claim” and that it “would not cover repair and replacement costs.”[11] It told Bailey that if it made a payment based on market value, “that would be a total and final settlement and would not trigger the replacement cost coverage contained in the contract.”
In the alternative, the insurer demanded that Bailey “purchase another dwelling of like kind and quality” as a cheaper alternative to rebuilding her home.[12] (Nothing in the policy even suggested the insured could be required to purchase another home in lieu of repairing or rebuilding the damaged property.)
More than seven months after her loss, Bailey had received no payment whatsoever from Farmers Union. She was faced with the imminent threat that the city would demolish the wreckage of her home, at her expense, and she would lose any opportunity to repair the structure.
Convinced that negotiations had “stalled out” over the disagreement over policy provisions concerning replacement cost value, Bailey filed suit against Farmers Union for breach of the policy contract.[13]
Farmers Union defended on a theory that Bailey was not entitled to replacement coverage value, because she had failed to satisfy certain policy conditions, including that she “rebuild and claim replacement costs within 180 days of the loss. . . .”[14]
The trial court found those arguments repugnant, and it granted judgment to Bailey. It held that Farmers Union “intended from the outset to ‘get out of this claim’” or “‘pay less than [its] insured rightfully deserved,’” that “Farmers Union’s conduct was ‘almost criminal,’ as it exploited its corporate advantage in what should have been a fiduciary relationship with a poor, disabled, black woman suffering from lupus and raising two children, who suddenly found herself with no place to live and with no means of rebuilding her home without the cooperation of Farmers Union;” and that, “the intransigence of Farmers Union prevented Bailey from complying with the policy provision requiring her to rebuild and claim replacement costs within 180 days of the loss.”
The trial court held that Bailey was entitled to replacement cost value coverage notwithstanding the fact that she failed to comply with the terms of her policy requiring her to rebuild or replace the insured premises within 180 days after loss and make claim for the cost of such replacement.[15]
On appeal, Farmers Union cited authorities upholding an insurer’s right to require repair before payment of replacement costs, “as a means of preventing fraud by the insured . . . .”[16] The Nebraska Court of Appeals distinguished those cases by the fact that none of them “addressed the scenario in which the insured failed to meet a time deadline because of the interference of the insurer.”[17]
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that,
Bailey was prevented from satisfying the condition of rebuilding and claiming costs within 180 days by Farmers Union’s refusal to assure [her] that, in addition to the actual cash value figure, the cost of rebuilding her home would be covered up to the policy limit.[18]
It explained that, as a general principle of contract law, “[a] condition is excused if the occurrence of the condition is prevented by the party whose performance is dependent upon the condition.”[19] It held that this principle was applicable to contracts of insurance; and an insured,
…should not be barred from recovery for failure to rebuild within the time constraints of the policy when the conduct of the insurer prevented the insured from rebuilding.[20]
Similar facts were presented in Pollock v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 423 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Mich. App. 1998), wherein the policyholder’s house was damaged by fire, and the insurer denied the claim.[21] The plaintiff filed a proof of loss and demanded appraisal, but the insurer did not honor the claim or appoint an appraiser, so the plaintiff filed suit fourteen months after the loss.
Approximately two years later, the plaintiff’s house was demolished by order of the township, which determined it would no longer delay that activity. Two weeks after the plaintiff’s house was demolished, the insurer forwarded partial payment (about half) of the actual cash value of the structure to her and asserted that it could not be liable for replacement cost because she did not repair, replace or rebuild her house in accordance with the policy provisions.[22]
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the plaintiff was entitled to replacement cost. It held there is “no reason to hold an insurer less accountable for its actions than another contracting party,” stating:
[D]efendant’s failure to pay on the claim hindered, and quite possibly even prevented, plaintiff from complying with her obligation to repair or replace the building. Had defendant immediately paid in good faith the actual cash value of the loss, holding the additional amount due under the replacement cost provision in reserve until the replacement was made or contracted for, or had otherwise worked with plaintiff to insure her financial ability to immediately proceed with the replacement or repair, a different result might be called for. However, defendant did not work with plaintiff to promptly pay the claim and enable her to repair or replace the building; rather, it did as much as possible to hinder plaintiff and delay or prevent the payment of the claim. We will not now allow defendant to raise as a defense plaintiff’s failure to perform an act which defendant itself greatly hindered plaintiff from performing. See Woody v. Tamer, . . . 405 N.W.2d 213 ([Mich. App.] 1987) (where a duty to perform has been rendered impossible, the failure to perform the duty is not a breach of contract).[23]
Without limitation, a similar analysis has been applied or approved by courts in California,[24] Connecticut,[25] Illinois,[26] Indiana,[27] Iowa,[28] New Jersey,[29] New York,[30] Maine,[31] Michigan,[32] Missouri,[33] and Texas.[34] However, Florida case law may compel an opposite result.
In Florida Insurance Guarantee Association v. Somerset Homeowners Association, Inc.,[35] the Florida District Court of Appeals rejected a policyholder’s assertion that the doctrine of prevention of performance excused it from repairing or replacing the damaged property as a precondition to recovering replacement cost.
It adopted the recent Eleventh Circuit opinion in Buckley Towers Condo., Inc. v. QBE Insurance Corporation,[36] which announced a rejection of prior federal precedent predicting Florida law on the issue. The stated rationale was that the doctrine should not be used to rewrite the plain and unambiguous terms of an insurance contract.[37]
While no reported Kansas appellate case has squarely addressed prevention of performance in the context of a dispute over replacement cost value under a property insurance policy, Kansas does follow Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 253[38] and the rule that “a party who demands a condition precedent cannot hinder, delay or prevent its happening for the purpose of avoiding performance under the contract.”[39]
In that regard, the Kansas Supreme Court has announced and applied what it calls the “universal rule:”
The rule is clear and well settled, and founded in absolute justice, that a party to a contract cannot prevent performance by another and derive any benefit, or escape any liability, from his own failure to perform a necessary condition.[40]
Consequently, it is likely that Kansas law would compel a similar outcome under the facts presented in Bailey and Pollock.
2. Repudiation / Anticipatory Breach: Once a party repudiates a contractual duty before performance is due, the other party may enforce the obligation by filing a claim for damages without fulfilling any conditions precedent.
The Iowa Supreme Court employed a different analysis to reach the same result in Conrad Brothers v. John Deere Insurance Company.[41] In that case, a windstorm extensively damaged an office building and destroyed a storage and maintenance building owned by the named insured.
The named insured closed its business and relinquished its interest in the buildings to its mortgage company, Conrad Brothers, by deed in lieu of foreclosure. The buildings were insured by a replacement cost value policy.
The mortgage agreement provided for assignment of the insurance policy rights to Conrad Brothers upon filing of the deed in lieu of foreclosure. The assignment vested Conrad Brothers in all of the named insured’s rights under the policy.
The insurer tendered the actual cash value (less the deductible) to the named insured, which subsequently endorsed the check to Conrad Brothers. Conrad Brothers then notified the insurer that it was making a claim for replacement cost value, and the insurance company denied the claim on the mistaken belief that Conrad Brothers was not entitled to enforce the policy.
Conrad Brothers sued the insurer for breach of contract, seeking replacement cost value of the building. The district court granted summary judgment for Conrad Brothers, concluding that its assignment was effective, and it was entitled to receive the replacement cost value under the policy despite the fact it had not repaired or replaced the buildings. The court found it would be unreasonable to require Conrad Brothers to comply with the condition when the insurer was disputing the coverage.[42]
In affirming the trial court, the Iowa Supreme Court discussed Bailey and other cases, noting their reasoning was “sound.” However, it questioned whether those cases were applicable to an insurer who denied a claim in good faith. It determined that another doctrine was available to permit Conrad Brothers to obtain a judgment for replacement costs without first replacing the buildings.
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 253(2), the Iowa Supreme Court discussed the contract law principle that “[w]here one party to a contract repudiates the contract before the time for performance has arrived, the other party is relieved from its performance.”[43] It further explained that,
[O]nce a party repudiates a contractual duty before performance is due, the other party may enforce the obligation by filing a claim for damages without fulfilling any conditions precedent.[44]
In other words, “[a] repudiation of a contract is accorded the same effect as a breach by nonperformance.”[45]
Applying that framework, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the insurer’s coverage denial — even if based on a mistaken interpretation — “was a clear intent not to perform.”[46]
Thus, the insurer repudiated the contract and excused Conrad Brothers of further performance. In so ruling, the Court explained: “[A] party typically ‘acts at its peril if that party, insisting on what it mistakenly believes to be its rights, refuses to perform its duty.’”[47]
This conclusion is consistent with the general view that an insured is excused under the doctrine of repudiation from compliance with preliminary conditions of an insurance policy when “an insurance company indicates that it will not pay an insurance loss in any event.”[48]
The Court found that, because Conrad Brothers was ready and willing to perform and would have done so but for the repudiation, the repudiation contributed to its nonperformance. Consequently, Conrad Brothers was entitled to recover replacement cost value without repairing or replacing the damaged property. It justified the outcome as follows:
The result in this case may seem somewhat harsh considering there was no evidence that [the insurer] denied coverage in bad faith. However, there are three factors which mitigate any harshness of the result. First, insurers may resolve coverage disputes without repudiating the insurance contract by utilizing such procedural devices as declaratory judgments. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 250 cmt. d. Second, even though an insurer denies coverage in good faith, the result to the insured, or an assignee of the insured’s claim, is the same. The insured or assignee will not obtain coverage by performing the condition precedent. Third, the insured is unable to use the insurer’s repudiation as a windfall, because the insured must prove the repudiation materially contributed to its nonperformance. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 255.[49]
Again, there is no reported Kansas case that squarely addresses repudiation before performance in the context of a dispute over replacement cost value under a property insurance policy. However, Kansas does follow Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 250[50] and the rule that anticipatory breach is the same as breach by nonperformance. The Kansas Supreme Court has announced the rule as follows:
Where a party bound by an executory contract repudiates his obligation before the time for performance, the promisee has, according to the great weight of authority, an option to treat the contract as ended so far as further performance is concerned, and to maintain an action at once for the damages occasioned by such anticipatory breach. The rule is the same whether the contract is wholly executory or has been partially executed.[51]
In light of the foregoing, it appears the rationale applied in Conrad Brothers would be equally powerful in Kansas.
3. Equitable Estoppel: An insurer may be estopped to complain that repair or replacement has not occurred where such activities are hindered by the insurer’s own activities.
In City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co.,[52] the California Court of Appeals, in addition to discussing other theories discussed in this article, held that an insurer was estopped from asserting the contracting provision in a policy which prevented the insured from recovering replacement costs. That case involved a fire loss to a building at a municipal airport with a replacement cost of between $950,000 and $2.6 million.[53]
The court held that the policyholder could not afford to “front” the cost of replacing the building and could not enter into a contract to replace it when faced with the uncertainty presented by the insurer’s delay in handling the claim and suggestion it intended to fight the claim and deny coverage.[54]
It held that the insurer was estopped to complain that actual replacement of the damaged property because its own activities delayed the performance of that condition by the policyholder until the time limitation for replacement had expired.
In announcing its decision, the Court explained:
Broadly speaking, “estoppel” refers less to a doctrine than to a conceptual pattern, first articulated in the courts of equity, which has come to pervade our law. When it is successfully invoked, the court in effect closes its ears to a point — a fact, argument, claim, or defense — on the ground that to permit its assertion would be intolerably unfair. It is commonly said that the party to be estopped, having conducted himself in manner X, will not be heard to assert Y.[55]
The Court further explained that estoppel, like waiver, effects a forfeiture of an otherwise viable right. However, unlike waiver, which requires a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of a right, “estoppel may arise involuntarily, and may effect the loss of rights the actor did not know he possessed.”[56]
Recognizing that courts have long held that equitable relief may be broadly available to relieve an insured of a forfeiture of benefits under a contractual condition of coverage, the Court held that the doctrine would be applied in the instant case to prevent the insurer from profiting from its own wrong in bringing about the conditions for the insured’s loss of coverage.[57]
Estoppel should be applicable to prevent an insurer from avoiding its obligation to pay replacement cost value coverage by frustrating the insured’s ability to complete a repair or replacement of the damaged property, even in jurisdictions, like Kansas, which follow the general rule that waiver and estoppel cannot be used to expand coverage of an insurance policy.
Even in those jurisdictions, an insured’s failure to comply with an insurance policy condition may be waived.[58] The requirement of repair or replacement is a condition of an RCV policy — not an exclusion from coverage.
In summary, there are a number of legal theories available to prevent a property insurer from avoiding its obligation to pay replacement cost value coverage by creating a paradox. Don’t let a cagey adjuster or insurance lawyer convince you, or the court, otherwise.
Endnotes
Form HO 00 03 100, Copyright Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1999.
Thomas v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 233 Kan. 775, 778-79 (1983) (where “actual cash value” clause was undefined and made no explicit reference to deduction of a depreciation amount, insured was entitled to full replacement cost).
Ins. Co. of N. Am. / Aetna Ins. Co. v. City of Coffeyville, 630 F. Supp. 166, 169-70 (distinguishing Thomas, supra, 233 Kan. 775, while construing “actual cash value” to mean “replacement cost minus depreciation”).
Lambert v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 178 Kan. 533, 534 (1954) (“actual cash value” of binned wheat is market value).
Pinet v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 126 A.2d 262, 265 (N. H. 1956) (“[N]either market value nor replacement cost is an exclusive test. Evidence of both market value and replacement cost with depreciation may be introduced as evidence of actual cash value.”).
498 N.W.2d at 594.
Id.
Id.
498 N.W.2d at 595-96.
498 N.W.2d at 596.
Id.
Id.
498 N.W.2d at 597.
498 N.W.2d at 598.
Id.
498 N.W.2d at 598 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Chadd v. Midwest Franchise Corp., 412 N.W.2d 453 (Neb. 1987)).
498 N.W.2d at 598-99.
423 N.W.2d at 234.
423 N.W.2d at 235.
423 N.W.2d at 237.
City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co., 165 Cal. App. 4th 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
Celebrate Windsor, Inc. v. Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co., No. 3:05CV282 (MRK), 2006 WL 1169816 (D. Conn. May 2, 2006).
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Miceli, 518 N.E.2d 357, 362 (Ill. App. 1987).
Rockford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pirtle, 911 N.E.2d 60, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Conrad Bros. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 640 N.W.2d 231, 240 (Ia. 2001).
Ward v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 1214 (N.J. Super. 2000).
Zaitchick v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 554 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. N.Y. 1982), aff’d without opinion 742 F.2d 1441 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 851, 104 S.Ct. 162, 78 L. Ed. 2d 148; but see Dickler v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Co., 957 F. 2d 1088, 1096 (3d Cir. 1992) (declining to follow Zaitchick in a commercial insurance claim).
Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson, 532 A.2d 686, 689 (Me. 1987) (Insured’s delay in replacing home destroyed by fire did not preclude recovery for replacement value of home, where delay in start of construction of new home was direct result of blatant misrepresentation by insurer’s adjuster).
McCahill v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 446 N.W.2d 579, 585 (Mich. 1989).
Gannon Int’l, Ltd. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 4:07-CV-31 CAS, 2008 WL 3244023 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 6, 2008).
Serv. Steel Warehouse Co., L.P. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. H-09-691, 2011 WL 43425 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2011).
No. 4D10-4157, 2011 WL 6373028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).
395 Fed. Appx. 659 (11th Cir. 2010).
Florida Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Somerset Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 4D10-4157, 2011 WL 6373028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).
Barnett v. Oliver, 18 Kan. App. 2d 672, 683 (1993).
Wallerius v. Hare, 194 Kan. 408, 412 (1965).
Wallerius, 194 Kan. at 412.
640 N.W.2d 231, 240 (Ia. 2001).
640 N.W.2d at 235.
640 N.W.2d at 241.
640 N.W.2d at 241 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 253 cmt. b; 13 Williston § 39:37, at 666, 668).
Id.
640 N.W.2d at 242.
640 N.W.2d at 241 (citing II E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.21, at 536-37 (2d ed.1998)).
640 N.W.2d at 242 (citing 13 Williston § 39:39, at 678; Larsen & Son v. Retail Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 212 237 N.W. 468, 470 (1931) (insurance company waives proof of loss when it denies liability despite knowledge of property destruction from fire)).
640 N.W.2d at 242.
Barnett v. Oliver, 18 Kan. App. 2d. 672, 683 (1993).
Wilson v. Nat’l Ref. Co., 126 Kan. 139, 141 (1928).
81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. App. 2008).
81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 77.
81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 89.
81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 96-97 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 97.
81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 98-99.
Russell v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 38 Kan. App. 2d 290, Syl. ¶ 1 (2007).