Unconditional: Public Liability Coverage for Interstate Motor Carrier Accidents Under the Federal Form MCS-90 Endorsement
By N. Russell Hazlewood
Originally published in the Journal of the Kansas Association for Justice, Vol. 33, No. 6 (July 2010). This article reflects the law as of that date.
Last year our firm prosecuted a lawsuit for a commercial truck driver against another commercial truck driver for bodily injury resulting from a collision of their respective tractor-trailer rigs on an interstate highway in western Kansas. As a result of the accident, our client suffered a significant cervical injury, and he could no longer perform his job. The damages were substantial, and liability was relatively clear.
Like most cases, however, this one had its problems. The tortfeasor driver was an out-of-state resident who was self-employed and judgment proof. He was not employed by the owner of the tractor-trailer rig at the time of the accident. In any event, the owner was an insolvent corporation that closed its doors before we filed suit. It did, however, carry liability insurance with a limit of $1,000,008.[1]
The tortfeasor driver disappeared (literally) after he was served with our suit papers. When he failed to respond to phone calls and written inquiries from his insuror, the carrier issued notice that its defense of the suit would be subject to a reservation of the right to deny coverage for non-cooperation. When the driver failed to respond to repeated phone calls and written inquiries from his insurance defense counsel over approximately nine months after he was served, the carrier threatened to pull the defense and refuse to indemnify him based on his failure to cooperate.
In other contexts, the above scenario—i.e., a judgment-proof omnibus insured who flatly refused to cooperate with his liability insuror—would be cause for panic among the plaintiff and his lawyers. Instead, our research confirmed that we had been presented with opportunity rather than adversity. As it turned out, we were hopeful that the insuror would pull the defense and deny coverage so we might obtain a collectible default judgment. Here’s why.
A. Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1980
The Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1980 requires entities registered as interstate motor carriers with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to maintain liability insurance for the protection of the public.[2] Congress passed the Act to address abuses that had arisen in the industry which threatened public safety, including the use by motor carriers of leased or borrowed vehicles to avoid financial responsibility for accidents that occurred while goods were being transported in interstate commerce.[3]
FMCSA has prescribed minimum levels of financial responsibility required, based on the type of carriage;[4] and it requires that registered interstate motor carriers’ liability insurance policies be endorsed by a prescribed form, known as a Form “MCS-90” endorsement.
B. Form MCS-90
The content of Form MCS-90 is set out in 49 C.F.R. § 387.15. On its face, Form MCS-90 is contractual—it is an amendatory endorsement to the insurance contract calculated to ensure that the policy conforms with the Federal Motor Carrier Act and the rules and regulations of FMCSA.[5] Form MCS-90 expressly supercedes any contrary language in the policy contract or any other endorsement thereto. It provides, inter alia:
In consideration of the premium stated in the policy to which this endorsement is attached, the insurer (the company) agrees to pay, within the limits of liability described herein, any final judgment recovered against the insured for public liability [(i.e., bodily injury, property damage, and environmental restoration)] resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles subject to the financial responsibility requirements of sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 regardless of whether or not each motor vehicle is specifically described in the policy and whether or not such negligence occurs on any route or in any territory authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere.
. . . .
It is understood and agreed that no condition, provision, stipulation, or limitation contained in the policy, this endorsement, or any other endorsement thereon, or violation thereof, shall relieve the company from liability or from the payment of any final judgment, within the limits of liability herein described, irrespective of the financial condition, insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured.[6] (Emphasis added).
In other words, the failure of an insured to satisfy a condition precedent to coverage under the policy will not excuse the liability insuror from paying a final judgment against its insured for bodily injury, property damage, or environmental restoration resulting from the negligence in operation, maintenance or use any vehicle subject to the financial responsibility requirements of the Federal Motor Carrier Act. The endorsement effectively shifts the risk of loss by guaranteeing that an injured party will be compensated even if a condition in the liability policy would otherwise provide the insurance carrier with a valid defense.[7]
C. Impact of Form MCS-90 on public liability insuror’s defense based on an insured’s failure to cooperate
As is typical of a liability insurance contract, the policy at issue in our case contained the following condition precedent to coverage: “[Y]ou and any involved insured must…[c]ooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or defense of the claim or suit.” That condition was clearly not being satisfied. How, then, is the defense of failure to cooperate impacted by Form MCS-90?
This issue was squarely presented in Campbell v. Bartlett, 975 F. 2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1992). There, a tractor-trailer rig driven by Campbell collided with another tractor-trailer rig driven by Bartlett in an accident in New Mexico. The accident resulted from the Bartlett’s attempt to make an illegal U-turn across a four-lane highway. Because Bartlett smelled strongly of alcohol, he was cited for driving while intoxicated and placed under arrest. At the hospital, a blood test confirmed that Bartlett was well beyond the legal limit for blood alcohol content at the time of the accident. Shortly after that test was taken, Bartlett disappeared from the hospital.[8]
Campbell was injured in the accident. He sued Bartlett and Bartlett’s employer in federal district court in New Mexico. He also joined Bartlett’s public liability insuror, USFIC, as a party defendant.[9] The attorneys who represented Bartlett were unable to obtain either his assistance in preparing a defense or his attendance at the jury trial.[10]
The jury awarded Campbell $200,000 in damages. Under the judgment the court entered, USFIC was made liable for the entire amount.[11]
On appeal, USFIC challenged the direct judgment against it. It asserted that the trial judge erred in denying USFIC the right to interpose a defense based on a breach of the cooperation clause in its policy by Bartlett. The 10th Circuit disagreed, finding that “the lack of cooperation defense has no merit under the insurance policy and the [Form MCS-90] motor carrier endorsement attached to it.”[12]
Citing the language from Form MCS-90 quoted in bold emphasis above, the 10th Circuit held that the endorsement “negates any inconsistent limiting provisions in the insurance policy to which it is attached… .”[13] The 10th Circuit thus concluded that the endorsement “prohibits assertion of the ‘condition, provision, stipulation, or limitation’ based on the cooperation clause so as to defeat recovery on the judgment for Campbell ‘against the insured [Bartlett] for public liability.’”[14] Stated another way, the 10th Circuit held that the cooperation clause defense was “unavailable to USFIC to prevent Campbell’s recovery on the direct judgment for $200,000 against USFIC.”[15]
In light of the foregoing, we concluded that a lack of cooperation defense would be similarly unavailable to the public liability insuror in our case. However, because the carrier never followed through with its threat to pull the defense and the case settled, the issue was never litigated.
D. Impact of Form MCS-90 on public liability insuror’s defense based on an insured’s failure to give prompt notice of the accident
Another coverage defense that arguably could have been raised in our case, but was not, was late notice. The policy conditions contained the typical requirement that the insured give the carrier “prompt notice of the accident.” However, because the tractor our tortfeasor was driving suffered minimal damage in the collision, neither he nor the owner reported the accident to the insuror. It is my understanding the insuror first learned of the accident when the suit papers were filed nearly two years later. Consequently, it had no reasonable opportunity to investigate the accident in real time; and it could have made a good argument that it had suffered prejudice. Nevertheless, under Form MCS-90, late notice would not have excused it from paying a judgment against the driver.
Similar facts were presented in Pierre v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 784 N.E. 2d 52 (N.Y. App. 2002). In that case, the plaintiff, Pierre, was injured when the vehicle he was driving was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by Harris. At the time, Harris’ vehicle was insured by a public liability insurance policy issued by Providence Washington Insurance Co. to the owner, Blue Hen Lines, which had leased the vehicle to Harris’ employer, Preston Conquest.[16]
Pierre sued Harris and Conquest approximately one year after the accident and obtained a default judgment against them. After an inquest, damages were assessed at $227,560. In the course of those proceedings, Pierre learned that Providence had issued the public liability policy to Blue Hen. Accordingly, he forwarded the judgment to Providence and demanded payment under the policy.[17] A garnishment action was unnecessary, because Form MCS-90 provides, inter alia:
[U]pon failure of the company to pay any final judgment recovered against the insured as provided herein, the judgment creditor may maintain an action in any court of competent jurisdiction against the company to compel such payment.[18]
Providence immediately disclaimed coverage on the ground that Harris and Conquest breached a condition of the policy by failing to timely inform Providence of the accident. Pierre then commenced suit against Providence seeking payment of the judgment.[19]
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In his motion, Pierre argued that the Form MCS-90 endorsement to the policy obviated the effect of the notice of accident condition in the policy, at least insofar as it obligated the insurance company to compensate the injured plaintiff. The trial court granted Pierre’s motion, holding that Providence was obligated to pay the judgment. The court reasoned that the MCS-90 endorsement eliminated the prompt notice condition as a defense in a claim brought by an injured party.[20] The New York Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the trial court’s judgment.[21]
E. How can one confirm whether a policy has been endorsed by Form MCS-90?
Although our research gave every indication that the policy at issue in our case should be endorsed by Form MCS-90, the copy of the policy produced to us in discovery did not include the endorsement. Nor was the endorsement identified in the policy declarations. Accordingly, I contacted the Federal Motor Carrier Administration and confirmed that the insurer had provided a Certificate of Insurance on the prescribed Forms BMC-91 or BMC-91X.[22]
Form BMC-91X provides, as is material here:
The receipt of this certificate by the FMCSA certifies that a policy or policies of Public Liability (or Automobile Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability) insurance has been issued by the company identified on the face of this form, that the company is qualified to make this filing under Section 387.315 or Section 387.411 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and that by the attachment of endorsement BMC 90, MCS 90 or a form of similar import prescribed by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, is amended to provide the coverage or security for the protection of the public required under Section 387.303 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations….
The endorsement(s) described herein may not be canceled or withdrawn until thirty (30) day after written notice has been submitted to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration at its offices in Washington, DC, on the prescribed Form BMC-35, Notice of Cancellation Motor Carrier Policies of Insurance under 49 U.S.C. 13906….
Falsification of this document can result in criminal penalties prescribed under 18 U.S.C. 1001.
In light of the above-referenced certification, we concluded the insurer would not be able to successfully assert that Form MCS-90 was not a part of its policy contract. Notably, that issue was also presented in Pierre v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., supra. Providence initially denied that the Form MCS-90 endorsement was a part of its policy contract notwithstanding the fact it had filed a certificate of insurance with the ICC (predecessor to the FMCSA) certifying it had included the endorsement and provided the policyholder the coverage mandated by federal law. However, the opinion reflects that position was later abandoned.[23]
F. Recourse for the insurer under Form MCS-90
From the above, it would appear that Form MCS-90 can result in harsh results for public liability insurers. However, Form MCS-90 expressly provides recourse for an insurer that becomes liable to make a payment it would not have made but for operation of the endorsement. In that regard, the endorsement provides:
[A]ll terms, conditions, and limitations in the policy to which the endorsement is attached shall remain in full force and effect as binding between the insured and the company. The insured agrees to reimburse the company for any payment made by the company on account of any accident, claim, or suit involving a breach of the terms of the policy, and for any payment that the company would not have been obligated to make under the provisions of the policy except for the agreement contained in this endorsement.[24]
The practical effect of this mechanism is to shift risk from the public to the insuror, while providing the insuror with an opportunity to seek reimbursement from its insured for breach of the terms of the policy contract. “Thus, the public is protected by insurance and ultimate responsibility rests on the truckers, all as mandated by Congress and the [FMCSA].”[25]
G. Conclusion
In our case, at least, the Form MCS-90 endorsement had its intended effect. Appropriate levels of financial responsibility were maintained, and we were able to make a sizeable recovery for an injured party despite the fact the tortfeasor driver was an insolvent independent contractor with no apparent interest in cooperating with his liability insuror. I am confident that but for the protections afforded by the Form MCS-90 endorsement in this case, otherwise available coverage defenses would have prevented us from obtaining a favorable result for our client.
The original article reproduced Form MCS-90 and Form BMC-91X as appendices. Both forms are published by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
Endnotes
That is not a typo—the additional $8 in coverage was indeed afforded by the policy.
49 U.S.C.A. §§ 13906(a), 31138-9; 49 C.F.R. at §§ 387.1 et seq., particularly §§ 387.7, 387.9, and 387.15 (2009).
Pierre v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 784 N.E. 2d 52, 54 (N.Y. App. 2002) (citing Empire Fire & Mar. Ins. Co. v. Guaranty Natl. Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 357, 362 (10th Cir.1989)).
49 C.F.R. § 837.9.
Caveat: Courts do not always interpret Form MCS-90 using a pure contract approach. Instead, there appear to be two basic approaches to the interpretation of the MCS-90. Depending upon which approach is used, the outcome may be different. One approach, with some variations in the case law, is to interpret the MCS-90 endorsement as any other policy endorsement, applying the usual rules for interpretation of insurance contracts. This is clearly the approach used in Campbell, infra. The other approach is to interpret the MCS-90 only in the context of the regulatory and statutory framework which mandates its existence. This is the approach followed in the more recent case of Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Yeates, 584 F.3d 868 (10th Cir. 2009), in which the 10th Circuit, sitting en banc, held: “When an injured party obtains a negligence judgment against a motor carrier, an insurer’s obligation under the MCS-90 endorsement is not triggered unless (1) the underlying insurance policy (to which the endorsement is attached) does not provide liability coverage for the accident, and (2) the carrier’s other insurance coverage is either insufficient to meet the federally-mandated minimums or non-existent. Once the federally-mandated minimums have been satisfied, however, the endorsement does not apply.” 584 F.3d at 879.
49 C.F.R. § 837.9.
Pierre, 784 N.E.2d at 59.
75 F.2d at 1572.
New Mexico law permits an insurer to be joined as a defendant in a tort action if the insurance is required by statute and benefits the public, and joinder is not prohibited by statute. Anchor Equities, Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Am., 737 P.2d 32, 533-34 (N.M. 1987). Kansas law similarly permits a direct action by an injured party against a motor carrier’s public liability insuror. Sterling v. Hartenstein, 185 Kan. 50, 56, 341 P.2d 90 (1959); K.S.A. § 66-1,128.
Campbell, 975 F.2d at 1572.
975 F.2d at 1572.
975 F.2d at 1579.
975 F.2d at 1581 (quoting Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Guarantee Nat’l Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 357, 362 (10th Cir. 1989)).
975 F.2d at 1581.
975 F.2d at 1581.
784 N.E.2d at 52-53.
784 N.E.2d at 53.
49 C.F.R. § 837.9.
784 N.E.2d at 53.
784 N.E.2d at 53-54.
784 N.E.2d at 62.
See 49 C.F.R. § 387.13.
784 N.E.2d at 54.
49 C.F.R. § 837.9.
Adams, 99 F.3d at 972.