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Cover of the Journal of the Kansas Association for Justice, July 2016 issue

Fish v. Kobach: The District of Kansas Seriously Discourages Discovery Abuse

July 2016 July 1, 2016

By N. Russell Hazlewood

Originally published in the Journal of the Kansas Association for Justice, Vol. 39 (July 2016). This article reflects the law as of that date.

Over the past 25 years, federal courts have become increasingly mindful of the problems of excessive discovery, on the one hand, and evasion or resistance to reasonable discovery, on the other hand. Studies published in the early 1980s reported lawyers’ widespread dissatisfaction with the high cost and ineffectiveness of discovery resulting from pervasive stonewalling and use of discovery tools for ulterior, tactical purposes.[1] Those studies also reported that an overwhelming majority of the lawyers surveyed wanted courts to take a stronger hand in discovery disputes and impose sanctions more frequently.[2] Since that time, the information explosion “has greatly increased both the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential for discovery to be used as an instrument for delay or oppression.”[3]

In 1983, 1993, and again in 2015, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 was amended to discourage “excessively costly and time-consuming activities that are disproportionate to the nature of the case, the amount involved, or the issues or values at stake.”[4] The amendments empowered and encouraged courts to place appropriate limits on the frequency and extent of use of discovery and to sanction discovery misconduct. The amendments further imposed obligations on both the propounding and responding lawyers to certify the appropriateness of each request or objection.

Many experienced lawyers have been engaging in discovery in the federal courts without realizing that Rule 26(g) mandates the imposition of sanctions against every lawyer who violates the Rule’s certification standards without substantial justification.[5] Accordingly, in Fish v. Kobach, Nos. 16-2105-JAR-JPO, 15-9300-JAR-JPO, 2016 WL 893797 (D. Kan. 2016), U.S. Magistrate Judge Rushfelt issued a concise and thoughtful order cautioning counsel of the import of Rule 26(g) and dispensing practical guidance on how discovery will be governed in the District of Kansas. Careful practitioners should take heed of the order, which I have attempted to unpack, paraphrase, and expand upon below.

1. Discovery must be proportional to the needs of the case.[6]

Fish v. Kobach makes clear that the court expects parties and counsel promulgating discovery to respect the new proportionality limitations of Rule 26(b):

The scope of discovery is set out in Rule 26(b), which provides:

[P]arties are entitled to obtain pretrial discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter provided it’s (a) relevant to a party’s claim or defense AND (b) proportional to the needs of [the] case. Under Rule 26(b)(1), whether any particular discovery request is proportional is to be determined by considering, to the extent they apply, the following six factors: (1) the importance of the issues at stake in the action, (2) the amount in controversy, (3) the parties’ relative access to relevant information, (4) the parties’ resources, (5) the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and (6) whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.[7]

The text of the rule itself provides:

(b) Discovery Scope and Limits.

(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

(2) Limitations on Frequency and Extent.

(A) When Permitted. By order, the court may alter the limits in these rules on the number of depositions and interrogatories or on the length of depositions under Rule 30. By order or local rule, the court may also limit the number of requests under Rule 36.

(B) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information. A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.

(C) When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).

2. “[L]awyers tend to be far too aggressive in asserting objections to discovery.”[8]

A. “General objections are improper and will not be tolerated.”[9]

In this judicial district, the assertion of “general objections” in discovery responses is ubiquitous. In fact, general objections are often given the distinction of a separately titled preamble to the specific responses. That practice is both improper and wholly ineffective.[10]

In Terracon Consultants v. Drash, No. 12-2345-EFM, 2013 WL 1633572 (D. Kan. 2013), U.S. Magistrate Judge Humphreys explained that, in the District of Kansas, “general objections are considered overly broad and ‘worthless’ unless the objections are substantiated with detailed explanations.”[11] In that case, for example, the plaintiffs asserted a general objection to the defendant’s interrogatories “to the extent they call for plaintiff[s] to do more than is required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” However, the plaintiff’s response contained “no clue as to what rule of civil procedure the defendant may have violated.”[12] Judge Humphreys held that such boilerplate general objections should be disregarded because they “only cause uncertainty and delay and are improper.”[13]

Similarly, in Johnson v. Kraft Foods North America, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 535 (D. Kan. 2006), U.S. Magistrate Judge Waxse deemed a party’s “general objections” waived, stating:

This Court has on several occasions disapproved of the practice of asserting a general objection “to the extent” it may apply to particular requests for discovery. The Court has characterized these types of objections as “worthless for anything beyond delay of the discovery.” Such objections are considered mere hypothetical or contingent possibilities, where the objecting party makes no meaningful effort to show the application of any such theoretical objection to any request for discovery. Thus, this Court has deemed such ostensible objections waived or declined to consider them as objections at all.

The Court agrees with these cases and holds that a general objection which objects to a discovery request “to the extent” that it asks the responding party to provide certain categories of documents or information is tantamount to asserting no objection at all.[14]

B. Objections based on undue burden must be supported by evidence.

A party may resist facially relevant discovery by demonstrating that it is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.[15] However, objections based on undue burden must be clearly supported by an affidavit or other evidentiary proof of the time or expense involved in responding to the discovery request.[16]

C. The scope of attorney-client privilege and work product protection is limited.

The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications by a client to an attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance from the attorney in his capacity as a legal advisor, as well as advice given by the lawyer in the course of representing the client.[17] The work-product doctrine protects from discovery those documents, things, and mental impressions of a party or its representative, particularly its attorney, developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.[18] The party asserting attorney-client privilege and/or work-product protection in response to discovery requests bears the burden of establishing that either or both apply.[19]

In Fish v. Kobach, Judge Rushfelt discouraged overly aggressive assertions of attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, pointing to a “wealth of guidance” in District of Kansas case law about what is and is not protected.

i. “‘[P]ersonal, confidential, or private information’ is not necessarily privileged.”[20]

As stated above, the attorney-client privilege applies to communications between attorneys and client involving a request for or delivery of legal advice. The privilege does not encompass other information, regardless of how confidential it may be. In Sonnino, Judge Waxse explained that it is “well settled that a concern for protecting confidentiality does not equate to privilege, and that information and documents are not shielded from discovery on the sole basis that they are confidential.”[21] In other words, “confidentiality does not equate to privilege.”[22]

ii. “[U]nderlying facts are not protected.”[23]

In Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 03-2200-JWL-DJW, 2006 WL 1867478, at *1 (D. Kan. July 1, 2006), Judge Waxse explained:

Not every communication between an attorney and client is privileged, only confidential communications which involve the requesting or giving of legal advice. The focal point of the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege lies with “communications” between attorneys and their clients related to legal advice. Legal advice must predominate for the communication to be protected. The privilege does not apply where the legal advice is merely incidental to business advice. And, although the privilege protects disclosure of substantive communication between attorney and client, “it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.”[24]

In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the United States Supreme Court shared a practical example of the distinction between a discoverable fact and a privileged communication:

The protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, ‘What did you say or write to the attorney?’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.[25]

A party may not conjure the privilege by choosing to “channel work through an attorney rather than perform the work with nonlegal personnel.”[26] “When an attorney is merely acting as a conduit for information, the privilege does not apply.”[27] Similarly, “[b]ecause the work product doctrine is intended only to guard against divulging the attorney’s strategies and legal impressions, it does not protect facts concerning the creation of work product or facts contained within work product. Thus, work product does not preclude inquiry into the mere fact of an investigation.”[28]

iii. Acts or services performed by an attorney during the course of representation are not protected.[29]

Nor is information privileged simply because it comes from an attorney. “The mere fact that one is an attorney does not render everything he does for or with the client privileged.”[30]

In United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1970), the defendant insurance executive was convicted of mail fraud, which he effected through acts of his attorney and agent. The government used the testimony of the defendant’s attorney to establish that defendant directed the criminal activity, and the defendant appealed on the grounds that the evidence violated his attorney-client privilege. The Eighth Circuit rejected the argument, explaining that the attorney-client privilege was not implicated, because the “testimony did not reveal any confidential information or advice derived from the professional relationship but simply the actual fact of [the attorney’s] employment and the fact that he did certain acts in [the defendant’s] behalf . . . .”[31] In other words, acts or services performed by an attorney during the course of the representation are not within the privilege because they are not communications.[32] Similarly, “[t]he subject matter of meetings with an attorney, the persons present, the location of the meetings, or the persons arranging the meetings are not protected by the privilege.”[33]

iv. The scope of an attorney’s services is not protected.[34]

In United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1995), the defendants were convicted of various charges arising from a bank fraud scheme. An attorney who worked in the defendant’s law office testified about certain aspects of the subject transactions, and the defendant asserted that testimony was privileged. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument, explaining:

Our decisions have recognized that the identity of the client, the amount of the fee, the identification of payment by case file name, and the general purpose of the work performed are usually not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. However, correspondence, bills, ledgers, statements and time records which also reveal the motive of the client in seeking representation, litigation strategy, or the specific nature of the services provided, such as researching particular areas of law, fall within the privilege.[35]

Applying that framework, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to the lawyer’s testimony concerning aspects of the defendant’s sale of condominiums, because none of the statements divulged the defendant’s motives, strategies, or goals in the sale of the condominiums.[36]

v. General topics of attorney-client discussions are not protected.[37]

In IMC Chemicals, Inc. v. Niro Inc., No. 98–2348–JTM, 2000 WL 1466495 (D. Kan. July 19, 2000), Judge Waxse explained:

The fact that a party had communications with its attorney is not privileged. Revelation of the ‘general topic of discussion’ between attorney and client, furthermore, does not waive the privilege, unless such revelation also reveals the substance of a protected communication. In addition, the privilege does not protect ‘the activities of an attorney’ as they are not communications.[38]

vi. A party’s ultimate legal conclusions are not protected.[39]

Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, No. 11-2684-JWL, 2014 WL 545544 (D. Kan. Feb. 11, 2014) was a patent infringement action. There, Judge O’Hara held that legal conclusions of Sprint’s in-house and outside counsel to the effect that Vonage was infringing Sprint’s patents could not be deemed privileged. He reasoned that the “ultimate legal conclusions of a party are always implicated at a trial, because it is those conclusions that lead parties to file and pursue lawsuits.”[40] Accordingly, he found such conclusions are not the type of substantive communication that privilege protects.[41]

vii. Investigative work is not protected work product unless done under the supervision of an attorney in preparation for the real and imminent threat of litigation or trial.[42]

Work product protection attaches only to materials prepared by a party or a party’s representative in anticipation of litigation or for trial.[43] In Presbyterian Manors, Inc. v. SimplexGrinnell, L.P., No. 09-2656-KHV, 2010 WL 3880027 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2010), an insurer resisted the production of its claim and investigation documents by asserting the work product doctrine.[44] In granting a motion to compel the production of those documents, U.S. Magistrate Judge Sebelius stated:

The [work product] doctrine is not intended to protect work prepared in the ordinary course of business or investigative work unless it was done so under the supervision of an attorney in preparation “for the real and imminent threat of litigation or trial.” For the doctrine to apply, there must be a real and substantial probability that litigation will occur at the time the documents were created.[45]

To determine whether documents are prepared “in anticipation of litigation,” a two-part litmus test is applied.[46] First, the document must have been created because of the litigation or in preparation for trial; second, the threat of litigation must be both “real and imminent.”[47] “Courts look to the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document to determine whether it constitutes work product. Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business or for other nonlitigation purposes are not protected by the work product doctrine.”[48]

Moreover, the fact that a party anticipates litigation does not make all documents thereafter generated subject to work product protection. A party claiming work product protection still must demonstrate the document was prepared principally or exclusively to assist in anticipated or ongoing litigation; that party must establish the underlying nexus between the preparation of the document and the specific litigation. . . .

The mere contingency that litigation may result is not determinative. If in connection with an accident or an event, a business entity in the ordinary course of business conducts an investigation for its own purposes, the resulting investigative report is producible. The fact that a defendant anticipates the contingency of litigation resulting from an accident or event does not automatically qualify an ‘in house’ report as work product. The primary motivating purpose behind the creation of a document or investigative report must be to aid in possible future litigation.[49]

Applying the foregoing, Judge Sebelius noted that “[c]ourts generally have held that reports made and statements taken by an insurance adjuster for an insurance company in the normal course of investigating a claim are prepared in the regular course of the company’s business and, therefore, not in anticipation of litigation or for trial.”[50] Because the insurer could not demonstrate that the documents contained within its claims and investigation files were created “‘because of’ litigation, rather than for processing [the] claim,” it did not meet its burden of establishing work product protection.[51]

D. When documents are withheld under the attorney-client privilege or work product protection, the burden is on the withholding party to produce a detailed privilege log. Otherwise, the privilege may be deemed waived.[52]

In Fish v. Kobach, Judge O’Hara reminded the parties that “when documents are withheld under the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the burden is on the withholding party to produce a detailed privilege log.”[53] Courts require that the log include:

1. A description of the document explaining whether the document is a memorandum, letter, email, etc.;

2. The date upon which the document was prepared;

3. The date of the document (if different from #2);

4. The identity of the person(s) who prepared the document;

5. The identity of the person(s) for whom the document was prepared, as well as the identities of those to whom the document and copies of the document were directed, “including an evidentiary showing based on competent evidence supporting any assertion that the document was created under the supervision of an attorney;”

6. The purpose of preparing the document, including an evidentiary showing, based on competent evidence, “supporting any assertion that the document was prepared in the course of adversarial litigation or in anticipation of a threat of adversarial litigation that was real and imminent;” a similar evidentiary showing that the subject of communications within the document relates to seeking or giving legal advice; and a showing, again based on competent evidence, “that the documents do not contain or incorporate nonprivileged underlying facts;”

7. The number of pages of the document;

8. The party’s basis for withholding discovery of the document (i.e., the specific privilege or protection being asserted); and

9. Any other pertinent information necessary to establish the elements of each asserted privilege.[54]

Failure to provide sufficient information to enable the court to determine whether each element of the asserted privilege has been satisfied may result in a waiver of the privilege.[55]

E. Objections may not be reserved. Conditional responses are invalid and unsustainable.[56]

Although not mentioned in Fish v. Kobach, Judge Waxse’s discovery opinion in Pro Fit Management, Inc. v. Lady of America Franchise Corp., No. 08-CV-2662-JAR/DJW, 2011 WL 939226 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011), objections overruled, No. 08-CV-2662-JAR-DJW, 2011 WL 1434626 (D. Kan. Apr. 14, 2011) is also worthy of examination. In that case, the defendant responded to discovery requests by asserting a number of objections and stating that it would produce responsive, nonprivileged documents “subject to and without waiving” its objections.[57] The plaintiff filed a motion to compel, asserting that the defendant’s discovery responses left it to guess whether the defendant produced all documents, or only produced some documents and withheld others on the basis of privilege.[58] The plaintiff asserted that such conditional responses “obscure[] potentially discoverable information” and leave the requesting party “with reason to believe that important documents have not been produced without a mechanism to compel production.”[59] Judge Waxse agreed and granted the plaintiff’s motion.

In Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, Judge O’Hara cited Pro Fit Management, Inc. v. Lady of America Franchise Corp. with approval, stating:

The court recognizes that it has become common practice among many practitioners to respond to discovery requests by asserting objections and then answering “subject to” or “without waiving” their objections. This practice, however, is manifestly confusing (at best) and misleading (at worse), and has no basis at all in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court joins a growing number of federal district courts in concluding that such conditional answers are invalid and unsustainable.[60]

Judge O’Hara further explained:

Rule 34(b)(2) permits only three responses to a request for production of documents: produce the documents as requested, “state an objection to the request” as a whole, or state an “objection to part of [the] request” provided that the response specifies the part objected to and responds to the nonobjectionable portion. “Objecting but answering subject to the objection is not one of the allowed choices under the Federal Rules.” Thus, no objections may be “reserved” under the rules; “they are either raised or they are waived.”[61]

Accordingly, Judge O’Hara announced that the District of Kansas will follow a bright-line rule established in other jurisdictions: “[W]henever an answer accompanies an objection, the objection is deemed waived and the answer, if responsive, stands.”[62]

3. Under Rule 26(g)(3), discovery sanctions are mandatory.

Judge O’Hara concluded his opinion in Fish v. Kobach by reminding the parties and counsel that the court will strictly enforce the certification requirements of Rule 26(g).

Rule 26(g) requires a responsible attorney or unrepresented party to certify that each disclosure is complete and correct at the time it is made, to the best of such person’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry.[63] And, with respect to any request, response, or objection, the responsible attorney or unrepresented party must certify that it is:

(i) consistent with [the] rules and warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law;

(ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and

(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.[64]

When a certification violates any of these standards without “substantial justification,” Rule 26(g)(3) affirmatively requires the court to impose an appropriate sanction against the responsible attorney or party, or both.[65] The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the violation.[66]

At the conclusion of his opinion in Fish v. Kobach, Judge O’Hara “strongly suggest[ed]” the parties “carefully review the excellent discussion of Rule 26(g) found in Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008).”[67] That opinion provides a concise and thorough discussion of the history, purpose, and application of the rule which cannot be better stated in this article.

Judge O’Hara has a practice of emphasizing the import of Rule 26(g) in scheduling conferences and in scheduling orders.[68] In Alexander v. BF Labs Inc., he invoked the rule to impose monetary sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel who engaged in “hide the ball” tactics by raising unfounded work product objections to the defendant’s contention interrogatories.[69] In Rowell v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., he imposed monetary sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel who provided answers “subject to” objections; objected to interrogatories “at random,” selectively choosing which interrogatories to object to without even providing a total number of interrogatories; objected to interrogatories as irrelevant without providing substantive support for those objections; objected to several requests as unduly burdensome without providing evidentiary proof of the time or expense involved in responding to the requests; and refused to answer certain requests but instead referred the defendant to documents already in its possession even though those documents did not answer the specific questions posed by the defendant.[70]

Similarly, in Bowers v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., No. CIV.A. 10-4141-JTM, 2012 WL 2798801 (D. Kan. July 9, 2012), Judge Waxse imposed monetary sanctions against a defendant that asserted overbroad and burdensome boilerplate objections not consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or warranted by existing law. In so ruling, Judge Waxse found that the defendant’s responses appeared to have been asserted for the improper purposes of causing unnecessary delay, and needlessly increasing the cost of the litigation.[71]

Similarly, in In re Spoonemore, 370 B.R. 833 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007), U.S. Bankruptcy Chief Judge Nugent imposed significant monetary sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) jointly against a creditor in a bankruptcy action and its counsel for asserting unfounded boilerplate objections and providing a deficient privilege log in connection with untimely discovery responses.[72]

You have been warned. Now go touch gloves, and keep it clean.

Endnotes

  1. Advisory Committee’s Note to 1983 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (citing, inter alia, Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 787 (1980)).

  2. See, e.g., Brazil, supra, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. at 865.

  3. Advisory Committee’s Note to 1993 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.

  4. Advisory Committee’s Note to 1983 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.

  5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3).

  6. Fish v. Kobach, 2016 WL 893797, at *1.

  7. Id.

  8. Id.

  9. Id.

  10. Id.

  11. 2013 WL 1633572, at *2 (citing Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 377, 381 (D. Kan. 2005); Starlight Intern., Inc. v. Herlihy, 181 F.R.D. 494, 497 (D. Kan. 1998)).

  12. Id.

  13. Id. (citing Starlight, 181 F.R.D. at 497).

  14. 236 F.R.D. at 538-539 (citing Sonnino v. University of Kansas, 221 F.R.D. 661, 666–67 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding that a party had not justified the application of any “privilege, protection, or immunity” and therefore waived whatever objection it might have asserted where the party asserted a general objection “to the extent” the interrogatories sought anything protected by any “applicable privilege, protection, or immunity”); Starlight, 181 F.R.D. at 497 (declining to find that party had asserted a valid objection of work product or attorney-client privilege where party made a general objection “to all interrogatories to the extent the information which is subject to the attorney-client privilege or which is . . . Defendants’ work product . . . .”); Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., No. Civ. A. 97–2391–GTV, 1998 WL 231135, at *1 (D. Kan. May 6, 1998); Swackhammer v. Sprint Corporation, 225 F.R.D. 658, 660–61 (D. Kan. 2004)).

  15. Super Film of Am., Inc. v. UCB Films, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 649, 651 (D. Kan. 2004); Scott v. Leavenworth Unified Sch. Dist., 190 F.R.D. 583, 585 (D. Kan. 1999). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(1) (limiting scope of discovery where the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit).

  16. Fish v. Kobach, 2016 WL 893797, at *1 (citing Waddell & Reed Fin., Inc. v. Torchmark Corp., 222 F.R.D. 450, 454 (D. Kan. 2004)) (citing Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 653 (D. Kan. 2004)); Klesch & Co. Ltd. v. Liberty Media Corp., 217 F.R.D. 517, 524 (D. Colo. 2003) (objecting party cannot sustain burden with boilerplate claims that requested discovery is burdensome); and McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp., 214 F.R.D. 642, 646 (D. Kan. 2003) (overruling objection of undue burden based in part on lack of affidavit or other proof).

  17. In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 232 F.R.D. 669, 674 (D. Kan. 2005) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981)).

  18. Kannaday v. Ball, 292 F.R.D. 640, 648 (D. Kan. 2013) (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc., 247 F.R.D. 656, 657 (D. Kan. 2007)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A).

  19. Id., 292 F.R.D. at 644 (citing Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. West, 748 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 1984); McCoo v. Denny’s Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 680 (D. Kan. 2000); Johnson v. Gmeinder, 191 F.R.D. 638, 642 (D. Kan. 2000)).

  20. Fish v. Kobach, 2016 WL 893797, at *1.

  21. Sonnino, 220 F.R.D. at 642 (citing General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 643 (D. Kan. 2003); Horizon Holdings, L.L.C. v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 208, 213 (D. Kan. 2002); Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 (1979) (citations omitted) (“[T]here is no absolute privilege for trade secrets and similar confidential information . . . .”)).

  22. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. at 643.

  23. Fish v. Kobach, 2016 WL 893797, at *1.

  24. 2006 WL 1867478, at *5 (D. Kan. July 1, 2006), review granted in part, cause remanded, 238 F.R.D. 633 (D. Kan. 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

  25. 449 U.S. at 395-96 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962) and citing Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977); State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 150 N.W.2d 387, 399 (Wis. 1967) (“the courts have noted that a party cannot conceal a fact merely by revealing it to his lawyer”)).

  26. In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 232 F.R.D. at 675.

  27. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 170 F.R.D. 481, 485 (D. Kan.), on reconsideration in part, 175 F.R.D. 321 (D. Kan. 1997) (citing U.S. ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell International Corporation, 144 F.R.D. 396 (D. Colo. 1992)).

  28. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262, 266 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 86, 89 (W.D. Okla. 1980)).

  29. Fish v. Kobach, at 1 (quoting Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, No. 11-2684-JWL, 2014 WL 545544, at 6 (D. Kan. Feb. 11, 2014)).

  30. Burton, 170 F.R.D. at 485 (citing United States v. Defazio, 899 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 1995 WL 354268 (N.D. Ill. 1995); United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1968)).

  31. 426 F.2d at 684-685.

  32. Burton, 170 F.R.D. at 484.

  33. Id. (citing United States v. Pappadio, 346 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); accord, Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, No. 11-2684-JWL, 2014 WL 545544, at *6 (D. Kan. Feb. 11, 2014)).

  34. Fish v. Kobach, 2016 WL 893797, at *1.

  35. United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d at 1205 (quoting Clarke v. American Commerce Nat. Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992)).

  36. Id.

  37. Fish v. Kobach, 2016 WL 893797, at *1.

  38. 2000 WL 1466495, at *11 (quoting Burton, 177 F.R.D. at 499). See also 1 Scott N. Stone & Robert K. Taylor, Testimonial Privileges § 1.26 (2d ed. 1993) (privilege does not extend to the nature of the legal services rendered unless disclosure reveals the substance of an attorney-client communication) (cited with approval in Burton, 177 F.R.D. at 500).

  39. Fish v. Kobach, 2016 WL 893797, at *1.

  40. Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P., 2014 WL 545544, at *6 (citing New Jersey v. Sprint, 258 F.R.D. at 427–28 (holding that testimony stating that legal counsel advised the defendant that it need not publicly disclose tax shelter issues did not waive the attorney-client privilege because it did not disclose the substance of the legal advice received)).

  41. Id.

  42. Fish v. Kobach, at 1-2 (citing Sprint Commc’ns, 2014 WL 545544, at *4).

  43. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A).

  44. 2010 WL 3880027, at *3.

  45. 2010 WL 3880027, at *5 (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc., 247 F.R.D. 656, 657 (D. Kan. 2007)).

  46. Id., at 6 (citing Marten v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. 96–2013–GTV, 1998 WL 13244, at 10 (D. Kan. Jan. 6, 1998)).

  47. Id.

  48. Id.

  49. Id. (citing Marten, 1998 WL 13244, at 11; quoting Zullig v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., No. 87–2342, 1989 WL 7901, at 4 (D. Kan. Jan. 17, 1989)).

  50. Id.

  51. Id., at *7.

  52. Fish v. Kobach, 2016 WL 893787, at *2; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A).

  53. Id.

  54. Id. at *2 (citing New Jersey v. Sprint Corp., 258 F.R.D. 421, 448 (D. Kan. 2009)).

  55. Id.

  56. Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 2014 WL 545544, at *2.

  57. 2011 WL 939226, at *8.

  58. Id., at *9.

  59. Id., at *8.

  60. Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 2014 WL 545544, at *2.

  61. Id. (quoting Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 906 F. Supp. 2d 938, 976 (D. Ariz. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)); Tardif v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, No. 2:09–CV–537–FTM–29SPC, 2011 WL 1627165, at 1 (M.D. Fla. April 29, 2011); and citing C.T. v. Liberal Sch. Dist., Nos. 06–2093, 06–2360, 2008 WL 394217, at 5 (D. Kan. Feb. 11, 2008) (holding that response listing various objections but stating that documents would be produced “without waiving said objections” was improper because it “is neither an objection, nor an adequate identification of the responsive document”); Haeger, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 976 (“What Goodyear could not do, but what it did, was combine its objections with a partial response without any indication that the response was, in fact, partial.”)).

  62. Id., at 3 (quoting Estridge v. Target Corp., No. 11–61490, 2012 WL 527051, at 2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2012) (quoting Tardif, 2011 WL 1627165, at *2)).

  63. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(A).

  64. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B).

  65. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3); Fish v. Kobach, 2016 WL 893787, at *2.

  66. Id.

  67. Fish v. Kobach, 2016 WL 893787, at 2, 3.

  68. See, e.g., Alexander v. BF Labs Inc., No. CV 14-2159-KHV, 2015 WL 4463634, at 4 (D. Kan. July 21, 2015); Rowell v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., No. 13-2514-CM, 2014 WL 2154422, at 10 (D. Kan. May 22, 2014).

  69. Id.

  70. 2014 WL 2154422, at *10.

  71. 2012 WL 2798801, at *7.

  72. 370 B.R. 835, et seq.