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Cover of the Journal of the Kansas Trial Lawyers Association, February 2021 issue

Accidental Death and the Presumption Against Suicide in Kansas

February 2021 Feb. 1, 2021

By N. Russell Hazlewood

Originally published in the Journal of the Kansas Trial Lawyers Association, Vol. 44 (February 2021). This article reflects the law as of that date.

By definition, accidental death and dismemberment insurance policies provide insurance limited to certain accidents. They do not provide benefits in the event the insured willfully takes his or her own life. Life insurance policies may or may not provide benefits in the event an insured commits suicide, depending on whether death occurs before or after the time prescribed by the policy’s suicide and contestability clauses. Some life insurance policies may also include an accidental death rider obligating the insurer to pay more than the death benefit in cases of accidental death. Those riders typically exclude death due to suicide, among other excluded causes. Frequently, however, death occurs under circumstances where the cause is unclear or even unknowable. How then can the beneficiaries meet their initial burden of demonstrating that the death was in fact accidental? In Kansas, and in most other jurisdictions, the beneficiaries are aided by a rebuttable presumption against suicide.

In cases where the cause of death is in issue but there is nothing to show how the death was caused, there is a negative presumption against suicide and an affirmative presumption of death by accidental means.[1] Where applicable, the presumption shifts the burden to the insurer to establish that the insured intended to take his or her own life.[2] The presumption is based on the almost universal characteristics of love of life and fear of death.[3] Kansas first adopted the presumption in Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wiswell, 56 Kan. 765, Syl. ¶ 2, 44 P. 996 (1896), wherein the presumption applied to a death resulting from an opium overdose. The presumption has been stated by the Kansas Supreme Court as follows: “Where evidence is nicely balanced as to whether or not deceased committed suicide, presumption is that death was not a result of suicide.”[4]

Importantly, the presumption may not be applicable to every case, and it may be rebutted by evidence tending to prove the cause of death. The insurer is not required to prove suicide beyond all doubt:

The word ‘presumption’ is sometimes used as a procedural term, allied to the burden of proof. The issue must be determined from circumstantial evidence — by the balancing of probabilities arising from the established facts. Where there is evidence tending to show a suicide, the presumption may be better described as an inference to be drawn from the universally recognized fact that the instinctive love of life is strong in the normal person. It is a matter to be considered with others in arriving at the most probable solution of a question which cannot be determined with absolute certainty.[5]

However, the insurer will lose a tie.

The presumption is contemplated in PIK-Civil 4th § 102.72, which provides the following guidance for a Kansas jury:

PRESUMPTION AGAINST SUICIDE

You must presume that _______ died of (accidental) (natural) causes unless you are persuaded by the evidence that (he) (she) took (his) (her) own life.

The notes to the PIK instruction indicate that an instruction on this presumption would only be proper when the deceased was sane at the time of death. However, this author could not find support for that proposition in the three cases cited in support of that note.[6] In fact, those cases appear to me to support an opposite conclusion. Specifically, in Muzenich v. Grand Carniolian Slovenian Catholic Union, 154 Kan. 537, 119 P.2d 504 (1941), the Kansas Supreme Court cast aside the need to prove that the decedent was capable of understanding and appreciating the moral nature and quality of his purpose. In Hawkins v. New York Life Ins. Co., 176 Kan. 24, 269 P.2d 389 (1954), the sanity of the decedent was not in issue; and the burden imposed on the decedent’s beneficiaries did not include proving sanity as an element of the cause of action. Likewise, in O’Brien v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109 Kan. 138, 197 P. 1100 (1921), the beneficiaries’ burden of proof did not include proving sanity. Rather, the insurer bore the burden to establish the death occurred as a result of a suicidal intent. In all these cases, the presumption was against suicide based on a love of life.

The notes to PIK-Civil 4th § 102.72 also direct the reader to see Peoples Bank of Pratt v. Integral Ins. Co., 251 Kan. 809, 840 P.2d 503 (1992), wherein the Kansas Supreme Court indicated that a trial court should not give a “love of life” instruction unless the cause of death must be established by circumstantial evidence. However, that was an automobile negligence case that did not involve a question of suicide. The Supreme Court held it was error to instruct the jury of a presumption that the plaintiff’s decedent “was exercising ordinary care to avoid injury” at the time of the automobile collision. The instruction was improper, because it gave the deceased a presumption of exercising ordinary care he would not have had if he had survived.[7] The instruction given in that case was so different from the currently prescribed instruction that the precedential import of the holding is questionable at best.[8]

One of the more interesting and instructive cases in the Kansas reports involving the presumption against suicide is Evans v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 249 Kan. 248, 815 P.2d 550 (1991), prosecuted by KTLA member Timothy J. King. Dr. Evans was a retired Wichita physician. Dr. Evans retired because of a number of health problems in 1986. In 1987, at age 65, Dr. Evans was being treated for major depression with melancholia in the psychiatric unit at Wesley Medical Center.[9]

Dr. Evans died in a fire in his hospital suite. A nurse found Dr. Evans in his bathroom, in the bathtub, with all of his clothing in flames. He died several hours later.[10]

Dr. Evans was insured under a group policy of accidental death and dismemberment insurance issued by Provident. His widow made a claim under the policy. Provident denied the claim based on an exclusion for suicide or intentional self-inflicted injuries. In essence, Provident’s position was that Dr. Evans intended to end his life by igniting his clothing. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a special verdict finding Dr. Evans’ death was accidental. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the widow.[11]

Provident appealed, complaining, inter alia, that the district court erred by giving the following instruction on the presumption against suicide: “If you are unable to decide whether the cause of death was accident or suicide, your verdict must be that the cause of death was by accident.”[12] That instruction was materially different from the PIK instruction typically used at the time.

The Kansas Supreme Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the history and purpose of the presumption against suicide, noting it is well-established Kansas law:

In cases where the cause of death is in issue but there is nothing to show how death was caused, there is a negative presumption against suicide and an affirmative presumption of death by accidental means. In other words, all other things being equal, it is to be presumed when a person is found dead, that he did not die by his own hand. This rule finds frequent application in actions upon insurance policies where there is doubt whether the death of the insured was caused by accident or by suicide.

The presumption against suicide is a rule of law which permits, and according to some courts requires, the conclusion, in the event of an unexplained death by violent injury, that the death was not suicidal, until credible evidence of self-destruction is offered. It is a strong presumption which should not be displaced by slight contrary proof and can be overcome by circumstantial evidence only if it is of such quality and weight to negate every reasonable inference of death by accident.[13]

While critical of the district court for departing from PIK, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It noted there was circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the death was accidental:

Weighing heavily in our conclusion are the particular facts involved herein. The deceased was a careless smoker with a long history of accidentally burning his clothes and household goods. One of the health problems causing his depression was extremely malodorous flatulence arising from abdominal surgery. He had a history of striking matches in the belief the burning sulphur ameliorated the unpleasant odor. The fire investigation herein revealed the deceased was sitting on the toilet when his clothing caught fire. He was wearing cotton flannel pajamas with the pants in place at the waist. Burned matches were on the floor. There was evidence the fire started in the crotch area of the pajamas. Provident was seeking to prove that the deceased committed suicide by intentionally setting fire to his crotch. There was no evidence that an accelerant was used. The jury was probably influenced by the unlikelihood that anyone, particularly a physician, would select this bizarre vehicle for suicide over less painful and more certain means.[14]

Notably, the Supreme Court also upheld the Court of Appeals’ rejection of Provident’s challenge to the district court’s jury instruction on the basis of the note in the PIK discussed above (and without discussion of whether the note is supported by authority):

Provident’s other line of argument with respect to the presumption against suicide is that no instruction should have been given since Dr. Evans was not a sane and normal person. The comment to PIK Civ. 2d 2.72 states: ‘It would appear this instruction would only be proper when the deceased was sane at the time of death.’

The record is devoid of any evidence that Dr. Evans was insane at the time of his death. He was clearly suffering from depression, but he had not been adjudicated insane, and there was no testimony to the effect that his condition warranted such a finding of insanity. In order for Provident to prevail on this point, the trial court would have to find as a matter of law that Dr. Evans was insane for the purposes of the presumption against suicide merely because he was being treated for severe depression. Provident cites no case law which would support such a finding nor is any apparent.[15]

Applying Evans, the United States District Court, in Edwards v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., granted summary judgment against an insurer on an accidental death and dismemberment policy where the insured died as the result of an overdose of oxycontin pills.[16] In so ruling, the court noted that it had been presented with circumstantial evidence which would support a finding of either suicide or accidental death. In disposing of the issue, as a matter of law, Judge Wesley Brown explained:

The presumption against suicide is not overcome by any evidence presented by Monumental showing that Smith’s death was a result of suicide, or any facts that controvert the Plaintiff’s theory that Smith’s death was an accident. Where the evidence as to the death being accidental or suicidal is so nearly balanced as to leave the question in doubt, the presumption is in favor of the theory of accidental death. The factual evidence before the court, and the cases cited, considered against the backdrop of the presumption against suicide, result in the conclusion that Smith’s death was accidental.[17]

Clearly, the presumption against suicide is a formidable arrow in the quiver of a trial lawyer representing claimants in life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment insurance cases. A claim should not be abandoned merely because the cause of death is uncertain or even where suicide is suspected.

Endnotes

  1. 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 276.

  2. McCoy v. Cent. States Life Ins. Co., 104 Kan. 571, 179 P. 969, 972 (1919).

  3. 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 276 (cited with approval in Evans v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 249 Kan. 248, 253, 815 P.2d 550, 555 (1991)) (erroneous citation corrected).

  4. Muzenich v. Grand Carniolian Slovenian Catholic Union of U.S., 154 Kan. 537, 119 P.2d 504, 505 (1941).

  5. O’Brien v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109 Kan. 138, 197 P. 1100, 1103 (1921).

  6. PIK-Civil 4th § 102.72 (citing Hawkins v. New York Life Ins. Co., 176 Kan. 24, 269 P.2d 389 (1954); Muzenich v. Grand Carniolian Slovenian Catholic Union, supra, 154 Kan. 537, 119 P.2d 504; O’Brien v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra, 109 Kan. 138, 197 P. 1100).

  7. 251 Kan. at 816, 840 P.2d at 508.

  8. But see 15 Kan. App. 2d at 102–03, 803 P.2d 1033 (disposing of insanity challenge on evidentiary grounds without addressing distinction addressed in this article); 249 Kan. at 258, 815 P.2d at 558 (affirming same).

  9. 249 Kan. at 250, 815 P.2d at 553.

  10. Evans v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 15 Kan. App. 2d 97, 98, 803 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1990).

  11. Id.

  12. 249 Kan. at 253, 815 P.2d at 555.

  13. Id. (citing 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 217).

  14. 249 Kan. at 257, 815 P.2d at 558.

  15. 249 Kan. at 258, 815 P.2d at 558 (quoting 15 Kan. App. 2d at 102–03, 803 P.2d 1033).

  16. 812 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (D. Kan. 2011), amended in part, No. 10-2299-EFM, 2012 WL 859607 (D. Kan. Mar. 13, 2012).

  17. Id. at 1271 (quoting Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wiswell, 56 Kan. 765, Syl. ¶ 2, 44 P. 996 (1896)).